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ABSTRACT
American Immigration Policies and Public Opinion on European Jews
From 1933 to 1945
by
Wesley P. Greear
This paper examines the role and scope of the American public’s opinion on European
Jews in the 1930s and 1940s. Significant attention is placed on several aspects of
American politics and public perceptions at this time. The ideas that developed from the
Great Depression through World War II on refugees and immigrants are closely
scrutinized.
The approach to this study focuses on sources from renowned Holocaust scholars
including Raul Hilberg, David S. Wyman, Martin Gilbert, Henry Feingold, Hadley
Cantril, Robert Divine, and Deborah E. Lipstadt to name a select few of the authors
referenced. Several newspapers and journals such as the New York Times, St. Louis PostDispatch, The Washington Post, The Christian Century, The Nation, and the New
Republic are referenced. The areas of focus are on public attitude, governmental
involvement, Jewish leadership in the United States, and military capabilities.
Conclusions of this study include apathy from participating parties, the inability to
organize strong rescue support, and the refusal to lower the immigration restrictions of
the time.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During World War II one of the greatest tragedies in world history occurred when the
Nazis, under the orders of Adolf Hitler, began the systematic elimination of European
Jews. In 1933, when the Nazis gained power in Germany, they began the systematic
persecution of German Jews. Hitler and his government began a slow process of
elimination that culminated in the mass killings, the “Final Solution,” that continued until
the end of World War II. The Nazi treatment of the Jews is fairly well known but what is
not so clear is the United States’ involvement, or lack of involvement, in stopping this
atrocity. This writer will show that within the United States government, especially the
State Department, several political factors contributed to tightened immigration laws.
Considerable emphasis will be placed on President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his role in
immigration policies during his presidency. The ideas, policies, and social problems of
the time shaped public opinion and unleashed hidden anti-Semitism that affected
decisions that pertained to immigration.
The United States’ attitude toward European Jews and all Eastern Europeans in
particular was a peculiar one from the inception of the country. From time to time prior
to World War II the United States intervened in Jewish affairs abroad, but when it
pertained to domestic affairs the United States had a history of indifference. Thomas
Paine in 1776 envisioned the United States as an asylum for mankind.1 In reality the
United States had a history of hostility toward immigrants that dated back to the late
1700s. In 1797 Representative Harrison G. Otis, who was a firm Federalist, instigated
the first public outcry to restrict immigration into the United States. Otis was one of the
first nativists to express views to restrict immigration fearing a French-type revolution
within the United States. Otis concluded that too many immigrants would undermine the
representative system that the United States was developing. This early attitude
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continued through the 19th century when farmers and commercial entrepreneurs were
afraid that immigrants would take their land and destroy the advantages they enjoyed.
By 1880 more than 400,000 Eastern Europeans were immigrating to the United States
and there were fears within the country that American civilization might be mongrelized
by this influx.2 This was not just the sentiment of protestant Americans, for Jewish
Americans feared this would bring unwanted attention and hostility towards them.
American Jewish indifference to their brethren in Europe dated back to the nineteenth
century. Americans Jews unwillingness to help European Jews immigrate in the 1930s
and 1940s found its prelude in the 1880s.
On several occasions the United States government intervened to protect Jews abroad
prior to the 1930s. In 1857, the United States intervened in Switzerland when Jews were
being persecuted and the American government proclaimed it was the principle of a
civilized society to help.3 This intervention caused the Swiss to adopt a constitution that
established religious liberty. In 1863, Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William H.
Seward, intervened on Jewish behalf in Tangier on the issue of Jewish treatment within
the Moorish empire. This would appear to be a more dubious time than pre-World War
II, considering the American Civil War was undecided at this point. If the United States
could concern itself with European Jews during the Civil War, why not in the early
1930s? The United States dissolved the Treaty of 1832 with Russia over events of 1881
in Warsaw, Poland, in which Jews were falsely accused of a fire alarm.4 The Russians
occupied Warsaw and they pillaged 1,000 shops that left 10,000 people without a
livelihood. The United States policy abroad did not apply only to small countries but
large ones as well. America had a history of aiding Jewish persecution until the Nazis
gained power. The United States went from humanity to apathy on the issue of Jewish
treatment throughout the world.
This entire discussion leads to why the most powerful organizations such as Congress,
the State Department, the President, religious groups, war veterans, and worker’s groups
all opposed immigration into this country. The most damaging was the United States
2
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Government and its implementation of anti-immigration laws, which later became antiJewish laws. United States Government officials did not want Jews to immigrate, and
President Roosevelt demonstrated his lack of interest and indifference by showing little
concern toward the quotas and restrictions placed on immigration.
Three culminating factors restrictionism, nativistic nationalism, and anti-Semitism
contributed to public resistance of European refugees into the United States.5
Restrictionism developed in the late 1800s and accelerated during the Great Depression
with the emerging unemployment in the United States during the 1930s. In the early
1900s groups such as the American Protective Association, Samuel Gompers American
Federation of Labor, and congressional restrictionists led by Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr.
pushed for immigration restriction.6 These influential men and groups were adamant
about restricting immigration, but for the most part were not successful in pre-depression
America. In the decade before World War I, 900,000 immigrants were admitted into the
United States. Jews accounted for about 10 percent of the new immigrants, and they
tended to congregate in urban centers in the East, which in turn gave them a greater
concentration of European immigrants than most other immigrants. Jews evaded many
of the restrictions placed on immigration, such as passing a literacy test, because of a
special provision that exempted persons fleeing persecution based on race or religious
faith. With this religious exemption the restrictionists could not limit Jews. They
however, could exclude most other groups from immigrating. Hence, their frustration
with their inability to keep the European Jews out of the United States.
In 1924 Congress responded to immense pressure from restrictionists by passing the
Johnson-Reed Bill or as it was better known the National Origins Act. The National
Origins Act provided two percent immigration of that country’s population or 120,000
visas to people of North and West European stock. These people were the Europeans that
were perceived to be the peoples that created the United States and they would preserve
the American bloodline. The people from Southern and Eastern Europe were virtually
excluded by this act. Samuel Gompers who represented the American worker
championed this bill even though prosperity was at an all time high. Influential
5
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congressmen and eugenicists Madison Grant and Harry Laughlin influenced business
leaders and warned that the large numbers of immigrants allowed into this country was
diluting the American bloodstream. The implementation of the strictest provisions of the
National Origins Act coincided with collapse of the American economy that plunged the
United States into the Great Depression. The strict enforcement of this act worsened the
Great Depression because immigrants were not allowed to secure jobs before they
entered the country as was allowed by the Alien Contract Law of 1885. About 300,000
immigrants a year entered the country after this act was implemented, but they could not
secure jobs and this caused even more unemployment. In retrospect, the National Origins
Act of 1924 did more damage to the economy than good and helped exacerbate the Great
Depression.
The Veterans of Foreign Wars were another outspoken group against foreign
immigration during this time. They began their anti-immigration struggle in the 1920s
and were a strong force in this movement. They, along with organizations such as the
Junior Order of United American Mechanics, and Father Charles E. Coughlin, brought
this form of anti-Semitism to the public’s attention in the early 1930s.7 It was the first
time that restrictionists began to use a public forum to advance their personal views.
Father Charles Coughlin, who was a Roman Catholic Priest from Detroit, would
instigate and antagonize immigration proposals for several years come with his radio
broadcasts and his publication Social Justice. Father Coughlin developed the theory of
the “international banker” as the person who destroyed American social and economic
structure in the 1920s, which in turn perpetrated the Great Depression. When Coughlin
used the term “international banker” he meant Jews, and he reinforced the theme
constantly. Coughlin used his radio talk show and his publication, Social Justice, as an
outlet to spread his assessment of what was wrong with the United States. The closing of
banks in the Detroit area in the 1930s strengthened his belief that bankers were evil and
they were at the core of causing the Great Depression. Because his rhetoric played on
American fears during the 1930s, Coughlin was able to convince many listeners to his
point of view. The restrictionists also believed that refugees were taking jobs away from
American workers. Jobs were an intense subject for Americans during this period, and
7
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refugees were perceived as a threat to any jobs that might be available. The Great
Depression had a profound affect on American public opinion with respect to refugees
from any country, not just Jews. This was one of the early movements that would shape
public opinion against immigration.
Father Coughlin formulated his political and personal prejudices out of the Great
Depression. Coughlin feared that wealth and power where being concentrated in a small
number of people in the United States with small merchants and small bankers slowly
being phased out. The problem with Coughlin’s conclusions was that he looked for
scapegoats as a cause for the Depression and did not consider the general process of
centralization that engulfed the American economic system. Critics have pointed out that
Coughlin failed to realize that the Depression was more a result of social and economic
relationships within a community that developed from social status and class.8 Coughlin
concluded the bankers on Wall Street and in London were the cause of the Depression.
Father Coughlin used the mood of the American public to convince many listeners that
the great bankers, i.e. Jews, of the world were destroying American society. He referred
to the American use of the gold standard for monetary purposes and he often used the
Rothschilds and other Jewish names as the influence for keeping the gold standard.
Coughlin gave the restrictionists, nativists, and anti-Semites a voice and further proof of a
Jewish conspiracy.
Coughlin spent most of his adult life in the American Midwest where anti-Semitism
had deep roots. The populist movement of the 1890s, the revival of the Ku Klux Klan in
the 1920s, and the Catholic Church itself which had underlying anti-Semitism because of
placing the blame for Christ’s death on the Jews.9 These developments shaped Father
Coughlin’s formative years and there was always a hint of this underlying bigotry within
his sermons. Even Coughlin’s colleagues perceived him to be personally anti-Semitic
and they claimed that he had a large library of material on the subject. Father Coughlin
was crucial in igniting American fears in the 1930s. He gave the anti-refugee
restrictionists a strong voice with two important media outlets to spread his message.

8
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The next idea, nativistic nationalism, also heavily influenced Americans during this
period. Many members of Congress who were influenced by a virulent attitude were
very vocal in their opposition to immigration. These early seeds that were being sown in
the public’s mind would have dire consequences in the near future. The main goal of the
nativists was to eliminate foreigners from American society in order to preserve
American resources for American citizens. In addition, they feared immigrants bringing a
different culture into the United States that might change the status quo.10 The people
and organizations that were promoting this were not only hate groups, such as the Ku
Klux Klan, but also Congressmen and Christian ministers as well. They occupied
positions that wielded an immense amount of influence on the public, especially in the
1930s and 1940s.
The third influence on immigration policies and public attitude, and probably the most
damaging, was anti-Semitism in the United States. Anti-Semitism had always had an
underlying place in American society, but it was more underground and not as obvious as
it was in other countries at this time. Jews, like other minority groups in the United
States, were excluded from clubs, social circles, and schools. Toward the end of the
1930s and mid-1940s anti-Semitism was prevalent and openly known. Father Charles
Coughlin, was one of the most outspoken and influential proponents of anti-Semitism in
the United States. Coughlin formed the Social Justice Movement, emulated by William
Dudley Pelley with his “Silver Shirts”, and the German-American Bund was also formed.
The German-American Bund was made up of middle-to-lower class German born
residents in the United States. This organization formed the American Nazi movement in
the United States and incorporated the Nazi military uniforms, swastika armbands, and
the Nazi military march into this country.11 The Bund received its inspiration and
direction from the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda and claimed a membership of 25,000.
The Bund operated 24 retreat camps, distributed pamphlets, and sponsored a national
radio program. The German-American Bund, which controlled the German-American
press, estimated that 90 percent of their readers were pro-Nazi by 1940. The Bund
reached its peak in 1939 and 1940 when they held patriotic rallies that sold out Madison
10
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Square Garden.12 Anti-Semitism became more organized and dangerous with the growth
of these types of groups. These groups to spread their hatred to the masses used the
media outlets of radio and newspaper print. Although the German-American Bund’s
influence would fade after World War II began, they helped lay the groundwork for antiimmigration groups.
One of the most dangerous anti-immigration and anti-Semites was William Dudley
Pelley. Pelley developed a strong organization with his “Silver Shirts” that claimed a
membership of about 100,000. Pelley’s true influence lay not only in the prolific literary
output that he disperse, but also his association with magazines and motion pictures for
release of propaganda.13 Pelley operated and used advantageously, an 80,000-dollar
publishing company in Asheville, North Carolina that published such pamphlets as What
Every Congressman Should Know, to promote his point of view. In his most successful
periodical called the Liberation, he claimed that there was a Jewish-Communist
conspiracy to take over the United States. This periodical erroneously emphasized
Roosevelt’s supposed Jewish ancestry and continually made reference to the “Kosher
New Deal”. In the nineteen months prior to 1938, Pelley and his “Silver Shirts” were the
largest, best financed, and best publicized fascist group in the United States.
Roman Catholic Church leaders, Protestant leaders, and American Jewish leaders
were not exempt from blame either. The Roman Catholic Church had a history of
indifference toward Jews, and this did not change throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The
Roman Catholic Church never seriously reprimanded Father Coughlin for his antiSemitic radio addresses. The lack of action by the hierarchy of the church allowed
Coughlin’s oral and written skills to galvanize ant-Semitic feelings in Catholic circles.14
Protestant Americans, especially the press, gave minute attention to the persecution of
European Jews from 1933 to 1945. Without any significant reports on Jewish
persecution, the American public never entirely grasped the problem at hand. The
American press, for the most part, virtually ignored the plight of European Jews.

12
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American Jewish apathy was a significant factor that hampered immigration and
rescue efforts. American Jewry did not organize into one cohesive unit until the War
Refugee Board was created in 1944. However, by 1944 there was no real hope to rescue
any large numbers of European Jews. Groups such as the American Jewish Congress,
American Jewish Committee, the Joint Distribution Committee, and the B’nai B’rith
showed a callous indifference to European Jews. The groups often used caution in
matters pertaining to immigration because they did not want to bring unwanted attention
on the Jews that were already in the United States. Also, the American Jewish leaders
blindly trusted F.D.R and surmised he was truly interested in their cause. This
misperceived trust in Roosevelt contributed to a deadly complacency of inaction from
these Jewish groups. Rabbi Stephen Wise was the most prolific Jewish leader in the
1930s and 1940s and his blind faith that Roosevelt would save the European Jews
influenced other leaders of American Jewry to follow F.D.R. without question.
The last chapter will explore the debate concerning whether the United States should
have bombed Auschwitz-Birkenau. Could we have bombed Auschwitz, was it militarily
feasible to do so, and why we did not have emerged as a major source of controversy
among historians. The Auschwitz-Birkenau debate has strong proponents and opponents.
Recent research has uncovered military reconnaissance photos of the annihilation camps
that showed the camps in great detail. Allied bombers flew missions that passed over the
rail lines that lead to the camps, the gas chambers, and crematoriums within the camps,
making them clearly visible to the trained eye. The source of the main debate was how
much did Allied commanders really know and would bombing the camps have diverted
invaluable military resources? Consequently, the Auschwitz-Birkenau debate has come
under intense scrutiny by historians.

13

CHAPTER 2
IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION FROM 1933-1939
In the 1930s the question of immigration, which would ultimately become entwined
with the Jewish question, became an issue with the American public. The refugee
problem that developed in the 1930s was accelerated by the Nazis policy of systematic
racial, political, and religious persecution.1 With the deepening of the Great Depression,
immigration, or a possible influx of aliens, was the issue that was sensitive to many
Americans. Unemployment, estimated at 15 million in 1932, put a premium on jobs in
the United States.2 A strong consensus among Americans stressed that any available jobs
should go to Americans without any competition from immigrants. In his 1932
presidential campaign Franklin Roosevelt, agreed with Hoover’s Executive Order of
1930 limiting immigration.3 As early as 1932 American Jewish groups foresaw serious
problems if they pushed for unlimited immigration policies. The employment loss
imposed by the Great Depression was tremendous, and the United States could not
support its own workforce much less an influx of immigrants from Europe. These
attitudes ultimately contributed to the loss of millions of lives.
In 1933 the Nazi Party under the leadership of Adolf Hitler legally gained power in
Germany, and it did not take long for the persecution of Jews to begin. On April 7, 1933,
the Reichstag, under Hitler’s influence, adopted the Restoration of the Professional Civil
Service Law that dismissed non-Aryans from governmental positions.4 This restoration
of this act was more significant than it appeared because the Civil Service decree
included bankers, lawyers, railroad and hospital workers, medicine, law, schools,
universities, and the arts. The Nazi intent of these laws was to eliminate Jewish influence
in Germany.
Not long after the Nazis implemented the Civil Service laws in Germany the first
significant protest against Jewish mistreatment came from the American Jewish
1
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Committee. This was a committee developed to protect the rights of Jews, and they
asked the American government to properly investigate what was happening in
Germany.5 The American Jewish Congress began protests and had a strong membership
and following that would help inform the rest of the country of the worsening conditions
in Germany. For the United States to protest another country’s treatment of its citizens
during the era of segregationist Jim Crow laws was somewhat hypocritical. The United
States had no basis to criticize another country for racial injustice when it practiced
similar discrimination of certain races of people. Nonetheless protests began and
Christian groups, such as the American Christians, made public protests against Nazi
anti-Semitic acts with the support of influential public figures such as Alfred E. Smith,
Newton D. Baker, and John W. Davis.6 Slowly information about Nazi anti-Semitic acts
began to filter into the United States. The State Department after hearing of these
allegations asked the American Embassy in Berlin to investigate these accusations. The
embassy liaison reported that there was good indication that the Nazis were hiding
something.7 When the Germans were questioned on this issue of Jewish mistreatment,
the Nazis claimed this anti-Semitic rhetoric and attacks were isolated incidents and they
were in process of being stopped. This was very early in Hitler’s regime and the true
magnitude of his hatred of Jews was not yet identified. Ranking United States
government individuals probably knew that Hitler inherently disliked Jews because of his
biography Mein Kamp, but there was no precedent of Jewish genocide to use as a guide
to future events.
Throughout 1933 reports of Jewish mistreatment at the hands of the Nazis kept
surfacing. H.R. Knickerbocker, who was the New York Evening Post correspondent in
Berlin, reported in April 1933 that an undetermined number of Jews had been killed, or
fled, or been deprived of their livelihood in the Reich.8 In this Newsweek article Mr.
Knickerbocker made two interesting observations. The first was that he did not
understand why the Nazis had such hatred for the Jews, and secondly he concluded that
the Germans were envious of Jewish accomplishments in Germany. These two
5
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conclusions would prove to be very astute in the years that followed, yet few people in
the United States seemed to understand what was happening to the Jews in Germany.
From the everyday citizen to the higher powers in the government this hatred was not
fully understood until it was too late. The Nazis under Hitler’s leadership ignited the
hidden anti-Jewish attitudes of gentiles in Germany. Hitler was a master orator and he
convinced the German citizens that the Jews were the reason that Germany lost World
War I and fell into economic despair in the 1920s.
As both protests and information increased throughout 1933, the magazine, The
Christian Century, began to publish articles on German Jews. The Christian Century, a
non-denominational publication, was the first Christian magazine to explore what was
occurring in Germany. On May 15, 1933, The Christian Century reported that two dozen
of the best known ministers in the United States united in a protest against Nazi treatment
of Jews. It was the first major protest of any Christian group against the Nazis. With
Christian group involvement the religious organizations in the United States began to
take the Jewish question more seriously. Another sign that the undertakings in Germany
were becoming serious surfaced when the National Conference of Jews and Christians
released a joint statement condemning Jewish mistreatment.9 Although organized
Christian groups spoke out and protested against Nazi mistreatment there was never
really anything done. There was no protest or movement to liberalize the restrictive
immigration policies that were in place in the United States. The reoccurring theme was
protest from afar without doing anything to help relocate the German Jews into the
United States of another country.
In May of 1933 the League of Nations reacted to a petition developed by Franz
Bernheim.10 Bernheim, a German-Jewish refugee from Upper Silesia, appealed to the
league that Hitler’s anti-Jewish laws and administrative acts violated the Polish-German
convention of 1922. The Polish-German convention of 1922 protected the rights of
minorities in this region. Bernheim was concerned because the Nazis were not in accord
with the rules set by the convention. For Bernheim even to appeal to the League
9
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indicated that the situation was deteriorating rapidly. He was a refugee from this area and
had first hand knowledge of the situation. The leaders of the American Jewish Congress
were so disturbed by these statements that they held emergency meetings that included
sympathetic congressmen and protested Nazi anti-Semitic acts.11 They petitioned the
Roosevelt Administration to condemn these actions, but nothing came of these efforts.
Ignoring these protests seemed to be the policy that the government would follow. It was
a time when the United States could have intervened, but the restrictionists in Congress
were too strong for a significant action to be taken against the Nazis. To condemn the
United States government for inaction at this point is not completely fair. The
Depression had the United States economically strained and government focus was
domestic. Anyway in 1933 no one could have predicted the atrocities that followed.
The debate over the treatment of Jews in Germany began to surface in prominent
American papers by July of 1933. Rabbi Stephen Wise and many of his colleagues began
to get the attention of the New York Times. Rabbi Wise was one of the most outspoken
opponents of Jewish mistreatment throughout the duration of Nazi rule in Germany.
Rabbi Wise declared that there would be “No Jewish Nazis”.12 By this Rabbi Wise
meant that German Jews should not try to assimilate into Nazi society because they
would not be allowed to. With Rabbi Wise leading the protest 142 college and university
presidents along with 77 of the United States’ top social scientists drafted a formal protest
about anti-Jewish policies and sent it to educators in Germany.13 This was an early sign
that Jewish leaders and American educators were concerned with the Jewish situation,
but not the nation as a whole. Economic hardships had a dampening effect on the
public’s view of the Jewish situation. Many Americans were worried about having
sufficient amounts of food, not with foreign affairs. The American public had a good
reason for ignoring this situation this early on, but not the government. The Roosevelt
Administration had access to all of this information and for all practical purposes ignored
the situation. Rabbi Wise was a strong supporter of Roosevelt, and Roosevelt could have
gone to him at anytime to find out exactly what had transpired in Germany. In
11
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Roosevelt’s defense it was difficult for him or State Department officials to do anything
at the beginning of Nazi rule. German Jews could not be forced to leave Germany.
Most German Jews stayed in 1933 because there was no historical precedent for the
systematic murder of their people.
Although there was an obvious lack of interest from government officials, one person
did speak out about the atrocities. James G. MacDonald, who was the chairman of the
Foreign Policy Association of New York, condemned what he witnessed in Germany.
Mr. MacDonald denounced the statement that Jews were not being mistreated as an insult
to one’s intelligence.14 MacDonald had seen the persecution first hand in 1933 and he
realized early that the problem in Germany was only going to get worse. MacDonald
criticized the American people and American Jews for their indifference and lack of
interest in the subject. He was openly critical of Jewish leaders and publicly asked how
intellectual Jews could possibly conclude that the worst of the Nazi treatment was over.15
In 1935 he was so distraught by the Nuremberg Laws that he wrote the Joint Distribution
Committee lambasting Jewish leadership and called for all Jews to help their brethren in
Europe. MacDonald was worried about the rivalry between Jewish leaders in America
and there opposition to the Zionist would cause serious conflict in the Jewish
communities. This problem would only worsen as the refugee issue became more
prevalent. MacDonald understood early on that without Jewish unity in the United States
the rest of the American population would not support their cause. He even stated that
the most difficult part of any rescue effort was to get Jewish groups to cooperate with
each other.
In July of 1933 a sign of future trouble surfaced when the Nazis, under the guidance of
Colonel Ernst Roehm, dedicated a memorial tablet in honor of two Germans who
assassinated German Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau in 1922.16 This was a significant
act because Rathenau was Jewish and Hitler’s chief of staff made the presentation. The
Nazis were making heroes out of individuals who murdered Jews. One might argue that
the American South did the same thing with people such as Nathan Bedford Forrest. This
argument had validity but neither F.D.R. nor the federal government ever erected these
14
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types of statues or memorials. Only the individual state officials did this. That is the
difference that needs to be understood. The German state under Nazi control condoned
these types of anti-Semitic acts.
In July of 1933 200 Jewish businessmen and shopkeepers were paraded through the
streets of Nuremburg under arrest.17 This was another blatant act of anti-Semitism by the
Nazis. If these businessmen had not been Jewish, then they would not have been singled
out by the Nazis. There was no response by the U.S. government officials and little
exposure in the papers. In reality, the U.S. would have looked hypocritical because of
their own segregation policies if they had protested. The Nazis would have ignored these
protests anyway because the U.S. was not in position to impose any form of sanctions
against them. The U.S. was in an economic quagmire and had no leverage to protest
against the Nazis. The St. Louis Dispatch was the only major publication that reported
this, but it was not a headline article by any standards. It seemed that just reporting this
information was enough for everyone. There were no cries of outrage in America, only
the common practice of the time, restrictionism. German Jewish leadership is not exempt
from blame either. They chose to try and appease the Nazis and make concessions that
they thought would keep the Nazis content. The religious community was a viable entity
in 1933 and they could have appealed to the world or protestant German leaders, but they
chose not to.
One influential publication carrying information about the persecution of Jews was
The Christian Century. In August of 1933 the journal was extremely critical of the lack
of interest and attention that the United States had given to the situation in Germany.18
Reinhold Niebuhr was critical of the United States non-involvement and his outspoken
rhetoric in The Christian Century was needed to make the public more aware of what was
occurring in Germany. Several other publications began to address this issue and slowly
many Americans began to discover that a problem existed. There was no
acknowledgment by the president or the State Department after these publications.
By December of 1933 there were signs that some changes were about to take place in
the State Department regarding the immigration issue. The first was when officials
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urged special quotas for special groups of refugees.19 The problem with special quotas
was that they would solve the temporary problem of immigration but not the long-term
problem of immigration. Special quotas were deemed necessary but lawmakers did not
want permanent changes to immigration laws. Jewish leaders did not advocate the
implementation of these laws either. The leaders of the American Jewish community
were in constant fear of an anti-Semitic backlash. Attorney-General Homer S.
Cummings ruled that consulates were obliged to give visas when the Secretary of Labor
had accepted a bond from a responsible person in the United States. The United States
fixed immigration quotas at 153, 774 in 1933. There were 23,068 new arrivals in 1934
and only 1,798 were Germans.20 By 1935 the number of German immigrants rose to
5,117 and only about one-third were Jewish. This was a fairly significant jump in
numbers for a three-year period for German immigration not German-Jewish
immigration. The new policy that was implemented by Attorney General Cummings did
not significantly change immigration of German Jews. After 1933 immigration quotas
can be directly linked to anti-Semitism because the system favored northern and western
Europeans and the National Origins Act of 1924 was heavy influenced by the threat of
Communism and that was associated with Polish Jewry.21
By 1935 the treatment of Jews in Germany worsened. The Nazis implemented the
Nuremberg Laws that severely restricted all facets of Jewish life in Germany.22 The first
stage of the Nuremberg Laws was to deprive German Jews of all their rights and the
second stage was to remove them altogether. This did not go unnoticed by Jewish
organizations in the United States. According to the New York Times, Rabbi Steven Wise
began to protest the lack of State Department involvement in the situation. Rabbi Wise
appeared before the House Investigation Committee to protest the lack of action taken by
the individuals in American Government and the fact that the government officials had
only made small protests and not taken any kind of action against the Nazis. Rabbi Wise
definitely informed important State Department officials of the atrocities in Germany, but
19

American Jewish Historical Society, “American Jewry, Refugees, and Immigration Restriction,”, 222.
Morse, While Six Million Died , 130.
21
Henry L. Feingold, Bearing Witness: How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust (Syracuse,
NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995) 61.
22
Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against The Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston,
1975) 69.
20

20

again these protests fell on deaf ears. By 1935 Jewish organization in the United States
was beginning to recognize that attempts to increase immigration would antagonize
groups like the Coughlinites, the Silver Shirts, and the German-American Bund.23
During 1935 David MacCormack, who was the Commissioner-General of Immigration,
made a statement that could now be considered a summation of State Department
opinions on European immigration during the depression. He stated that one of the best
ways to promote racial and religious antagonisms was to advocate increased immigration
during a period of depression and unemployment. This statement fairly well sums up
what was on the minds of many Americans during the depression.
In a 1936 editorial in the B’nai B’rith Magazine (Sons of the Covenant) American
Jewish leaders pleaded for Jews not to provide justification for anti-Semitism in the
United States. By making the plea American Jews were implying that they were bringing
anti-Semitism upon themselves. Many American Jews concluded that increased
immigration was the main reason for increased anti-Semitism. One could surmise that
many American Jews did not want Jewish immigrants to bring unwanted attention to
them. A majority of American Jews in essence did nothing to help European Jews
immigrate to this country as of 1936. Although Rabbi Wise and the American Jewish
Congress protested, the majority of American Jews did not want to give nativists and
restrictionists any reason to target all Jews. If Jews were not going to help each other,
why would they think anyone else would help? American Jewry should receive
considerable blame for a lack of interest in European Jews.
The American Protestant press also deserves partial blame in the lack of interest that
the American people had on the Jewish situation in Germany. In 1936 32 periodicals
were examined and 68 times church struggles were discussed and 49 times Jewish
persecution was discussed.24 Just one year later in 1937 33 periodicals were examined
with 91 references to church struggles and only 29 of these were related to Jewish
persecution. In one year’s time discussion on the Jewish persecution dropped almost by
half in protestant periodicals in the United States. That is a significant drop in attention
in a very short time. Also in 1936 44 articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor
23
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pertained to the Jewish dilemma but by 1937 there were only five items related to this
topic.25 Again, this reinforces the fact that the American Protestant press had almost no
interest in German Jews after 1937. It can be concluded that from 1936 through 1938
anti-Semitism was rampant in the Protestant press. The Citizen Times, in Asheville,
North Carolina, which was owned by William Dudley Pelley, The Advance, The
Christendom, The Churchman, and The Lutheran were all Protestant publications that did
not hide their contempt for Jews. These publications in conjunction with Father Coughlin
and American Jewish leaders unwillingness to speak out against the Nazis helped lead to
apathy among the American public.
By the end of 1937 the refugee dilemma had begun to stabilize somewhat and the
United States had the feeling that this situation was beginning to solve itself. This was all
about to change soon. In March of 1938 the Austrian Anschluss (annexation) and the
further Jewish exclusion in Germany sent a flood of refugees out of these countries. With
the Austrian Anschluss President Roosevelt decided to call for an international
conference at the end of March to discuss this crisis. This was the Evian Conference and
the timing of this conference confounded many members of Congress because the
unemployment rate had reached a new low during the New Deal and the restrictionists in
Congress were wielding immense power at this time.26 This international conference
offered Roosevelt very few advantages. The restrictionists were not going to allow any
new immigration laws to be passed. At the time it was inconceivable that an attempt to
modify immigration laws to draw a distinction between refugees and immigrants was a
possibility.27 This argument about making a difference between refugees and immigrants
raged throughout the 1930’s. Since quotas on immigration were being filled, it was when
pro-immigration groups wanted refugees to be excluded from the quotas that the heated
debates began. It was also believed that when Roosevelt found out what had been done
to Jews in Austria he wanted to reestablish America as a place of refuge for the
oppressed.
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During the conference Roosevelt was greatly influenced by two people. Dorothy
Thompson, who was prominent in keeping the American public informed on the refugee
situation and Rabbi Stephen Wise for whom Roosevelt had an enormous amount of
respect and affection. These two people are probably the reason that Roosevelt called for
the Evian Conference at a time when Americans were only interested in events at home.
Others at the time viewed this as a subtle way for Roosevelt to inform the American
public of the growing menace of the Nazis. What Roosevelt’s true intensions were are
unclear. This was possibly his way of finally getting involved without directly taking a
stand on the issue. This conference made many Jewish leaders happy and Roosevelt
received much praise for this action, but all inquires on refugees were sent through the
State Department. This would prove to be a difficult department to move toward their
point of view.
Around the same time as the Evian Conference two congressmen, Emanuel Celler and
Samuel Dickstein, tried to implement bills to allow for more refugees to enter the United
States.28 Samuel Dickstein wanted to increase the immigration quota by admitting
refugees under unused quotas that amounted to about 120,000. His bill would not have
affected immigration because these were unused quotas that could have been specified
for refugees. Dickstein ran into opposition from public opinion in southern and western
states. A Fortune Magazine survey on this subject disclosed that 83 percent of
Americans opposed increasing immigration quotas.29 The public opinion poll gave a
strong indication that the American public had no interest in expanding quotas no matter
what the circumstances were. The most puzzling part of the attitudes expressed in the
poll was the lack of protest by prominent Jewish groups. The B’nai B’rith Magazine did
not even mention the new immigration bills in editorials in 1938 like it did in 1935 when
other legislation was proposed. The situation in Germany and Austria was worse in 1938
than 1935, so editorials should have been more numerous in 1938. It appeared that even
the majority of American Jews were not interested in any kind of increased immigration.
The B’nai B’rith Magazine periodically ran editorials entitled “the Old America” that
often mentioned that the United States’ doors were open to anyone that wanted to enter,
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but after 1938 these subtle editorial criticisms stopped. This seemed the typical response
of influential Jewish magazines by the late 1930s.
In 1938 another set back incurred on the increasing of refugee immigration. The
Roosevelt Administration chose to combine the German and Austrian quotas together. In
essence when the Germans gained control of Austria the latter’s quota was eliminated.
An extra 190,000 Jews became refugees and the State Department did not increase the
quotas to meet this demand.30 Clearly the Roosevelt Administration was trying to
navigate its way through two forces at minimal political risk to them. The restrictionists
were strong because of the Depression and many Jewish communities were immensely
loyal to Roosevelt and his administration. Roosevelt placed the dilemma of the refugeeimmigration problem in the hands of the State Department and placed pressure directly
on Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. It was definitely a political move on Roosevelt’s
part. Anytime there was negative public reaction to any immigration policy the State
Department and Hull absorbed the brunt of the criticism. Which allowed Roosevelt to
maintain his support from American Jews and appear to the public as a sympathizer to
the refugee problem. In reality Roosevelt showed only a passing interest in the subject
but his constituents still viewed him as Jewish sympathizer. Allowing the State
Department to be in charge of the refugee crisis was an excellent political move but the
move did nothing to help European Jews. In fact, during 1938 and 1939 restrictionists
flooded the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization with anti-refugee
proposals.31 The House Appropriation Subcommittee refused to fund the policy that
allowed refugees on visitor’s visas to establish residency in Canada, which in turn would
qualify them for regular visas in the United States. These restrictions placed an
enormous amount of obstacles in front of the refugees and Congress was at the center of
it.
The opposition in Congress was not limited to just a few congressmen, but rather it
encompassed Congress as a whole. Representatives from several states warned of
becoming immersed in European affairs, while one representative made the statement
that every disgruntled element that applied for admission in this country claimed that they
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were being oppressed, in their country.32 This statement could be interpreted as implying
that German Jews were claiming to be oppressed because they were not satisfied with the
Nazis. Patriotic groups and veterans groups along with public opinion appeared to be
hostile towards aiding refugees. The Fortune Magazine poll, taken in the summer of
1938, showed that 67 percent of the people did not want to give any aid to refugees.33
This was well over a majority percentage of the American people polled. These attitudes
factor back to the economic problems in the U.S. and the influence of the restrictionists in
Congress.
1938 was a crucial year in regards to the refugee issue. Anti-Semitism was at a
decade high in 1938 and Evian did absolutely nothing to solve the immigration issue.
American Jewish leaders concluded that American Jews needed to be more patriotic than
before and this caused the leaders to become more passive in their denunciation of the
Nazis. Jewish leaders did form the General Jewish Council comprised of the American
Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, B’nai B’rith, and the Jewish Labor
Committee to control the amount of protest that was printed about Kristallnacht—the
night of broken glass.34 In 1938 Jewish leaders made it a priority to not bring any
attention to the refugee plight. The influence and power of the restrictionists in Congress
was widespread even though American Jews chaired the three major committees on
immigration and rescue in 1938. Representative Sol Bloom chaired the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Representative Samuel Dickstein chaired the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, and Representative Emmanuel Cellar chaired the House
Judiciary Committee.35 Although, these three men had considerable influence within
these committees they could not get any significant refugee legislation passed or change
the National Origins Act of 1924.
In 1939 the debate over the refugee crisis began to heighten. On Krisallnacht, or the
night of broken glass, the Nazis had unleashed in November of 1938 an unmatched night
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of terror on German Jews and the Nazi invasion of Poland in September of 1939 shocked
the people of the United States. Journalists from leading periodicals such as the Nation
and the New Republic wrote editorials protesting the United States’ strict immigration
laws and accused the restrictionists of anti-Semitism, with one writer stating, “Slamming
shut the gates of immigration is admitting that American democracy has failed in the past
and no longer exists today.” The restrictionists fought back with grave vengeance.
Henry Pratt Fairchild warned that the admission of large numbers of Jews would cause
American anti-Semitism to “burst out into violent eruption.” Representative Will Taylor
of Tennessee argued that the New Deal showed more concern for European refugees than
for the 10 million American refugees that walked our city streets in desperation. Public
opinion at this time was again on the restrictionist’s side when a Fortune survey in April
showed that 83 percent of the American people were against raising immigration quotas.
It was obvious to most Americans that by the end of the 1930s the New Deal had not
solved the problem of unemployment as compared to Nazi Germany that had very low
unemployment and a massive military build-up. Generally, the American people were
not convinced that these immigrants would have little or no effect on the economy and
they would not take jobs away. This is indicative that the Roosevelt administration did
not want an influx of European Jews in this country.
Throughout 1939 more and more congressmen began proposing bills that would end
or significantly reduce the immigration quotas. The most serious proposal against
immigration was a cluster of five measures presented to the Senate by Robert Reynolds
of North Carolina. The bill would have reduced quotas by 90 percent and halted
permanent immigration for ten years or until unemployment in the United States fell
below three million. The most interesting point about this proposal was that the
Subcommittee on Immigration held three days of discussions on the bill.36 In retrospect,
it is difficult to comprehend that a proposal that would have virtually ended all
immigration would even be considered. Senator Reynolds and the restrictionists wielded
their influence when it came to issues of immigration. James L. Houghteling, who was
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, attended all meetings of the
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Immigration Committees in Congress in 1939 and reported to President Roosevelt that
most of Congress leaned toward reducing existing immigration quotas. This reiterates
the point that there were not a few congressmen that felt this way but a strong majority.
Father Coughlin questioned this in the Social Justice and other journals such as the
Commonweal and the Christian Century were irritated and openly opposed to any
increase in immigration quotas. Non-Jewish groups were outspoken and adamant about
not increasing the quotas. These groups were the majority in the United States and had a
much stronger following than Jewish organizations did.
The introduction of the Wagner-Rogers Bill was the only proposal during this time
that seriously attempted to liberalize the National Origins Act of 1924.37 This bill was
proposed to help emigrate 20,000 German refugee children under the age of fourteen.
Even this bill met strong opposition in the United States. A Gallup Poll conducted in
1939 on the subject determined that 66% of the American people polled opposed the
admission of the children.38 The restrictionists argued that America should take care of
America’s children first and let Europe take care of European children. Only 45 Senators
were willing to reveal their feelings on the issue and 21 voted in favor while 24 voted
against the bill.39 Most of the opposition came from the South. Less than 15 percent of
southern congressmen in the upper house favored the bill. In the Far West and the
Northeast about 25 percent supported the proposal and in the Midwest a strong percent of
Senators supported the bill.40 The support of the Midwest was surprising because
isolationism and nativism was strongly supported in this region. Twenty-five percent of
Democrats and less than 10 percent of Republicans in Congress supported this bill. This
shows the strength of restrictionists, nativists, and anti-Semites in Congress at this time.
This was a bill to help children under the age of fourteen and it still could not get any
support. Again, there was no reaction from the Roosevelt Administration.
The British did nothing to help the refugee situation in 1939 when they passed the
White Paper Order in May 1939. This order basically closed Palestine to immigration
and left the United States out of options for relocation. Palestine was the biblical
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homeland of the Jews and a desired place for relocation. The Germans and Poles were
willing to allow Jews to immigrate in 1939 but there was just no place for them to go.
The Great Depression and the anti-alien fear in Congress basically closed the door for
any significant immigration to occur. The ordeal of the ocean liner, the St. Louis, in 1939
was an excellent example of American fear and indifference. The United States
government refused to allow the German Jews on board to enter the country and sent
them back to Germany. This was significant because the numbers were not that large and
it showed the determination the American government had to keep refugees out of the
country.

28

CHAPTER 3
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND PUBLIC OPINION FROM 1940-1945
With the outbreak of war in Europe the restrictionists developed a new policy to
support the need to deter immigration. The argument by congressmen and others that the
admission of refugees would endanger national security began to gain credence when the
restrictionists argued that the Nazis tried to use refugees to strengthen their economy. In
addition the Nazis planted espionage agents in with refugees.1 The argument was one
that resonated with the American people. The American public was terrified that the
Nazis disguised spies as refugees to infiltrate the United States and the advocates of
refugee rescue suffered a tremendous setback because they did not want to jeopardize
their credentials as loyal Americans by advocating the immigration of refugees regardless
of the security risks.
President Roosevelt did nothing to dissuade the American public of this supposed
threat. In one of his fireside chats of May, 1940 he stated that weapons were not our only
threat. He saw traitors, saboteurs, and spies also as a threat to national security.2
F.D.R.’s remarks were exactly what the restrictionists wanted to hear and Roosevelt had
obliged. In his chat, Roosevelt also referred to the Trojan horse and the fifth column as
new methods of attack against the United States.3 His Trojan horse analogy reinforced
the rhetoric of the Dies Committee, Leland Stowe, an anti-refugee columnist for the
Washington based publication the Evening Star, also used this analogy. Many people
listened. Restrictionists quickly discovered that the security issue could be played for
political gain.
The biggest reason that the concept of refugee espionage gained strength within in the
United States was the relative inexperience of the intelligence service personnel in the
State Department. The State Department intelligence agency went as far as to claim they
had sufficient evidence of fifth column activity that proved the German Jewish Children’s
Aid and the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HICEM), which was the oldest and most
1
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respected American Jewish rescue agency, was in actuality an espionage agency.4 This
statement alone was ludicrous enough for the general public, but to have people within
the State Department believe this was inconceivable. Common sense should have told
these officials that American Jews were not going to spy for a country that had
persecuted Jews. The comments department staff was an early indication of the hysteria
that would unfold in the next few years. William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to
France, stated in a speech in 1940 that more than one half of the spies captured who were
doing military spy work against the French were German refugees. Bullitt had no
evidence or basis for these accusations. The Nation published a letter from Heinz Pol, a
refugee journalist familiar with the French scene, that pointed out that not a single
refugee was involved in espionage in France. Well-respected magazines did nothing to
alleviate American fears that refugees were not a security risk. The restrictionists had
such strong backing in the government that they convinced the American people of a
conspiracy that did not exist. General anxiety among Americans at this time was on the
rise because of the ease in which the Nazis invaded Poland and France. In retrospect it is
understandable why the presence of a German fifth column could be so widely accepted
within the United States.
Other entries into the refugees as spy’s theory were the rumors of the seven Jewish
Abwehr agents in Latin America and Samuel Lubell’s article in the Saturday Evening
Post that claimed, from State Department records, the Nazis had developed a special
school in Prague where Gestapo agents learned to pass themselves as Jews.5 Although
some espionage was attempted in this way, it was not widespread nor was it the preferred
way for the Nazis. It was just another way for the restrictionists, nativists, and antiSemites to use the American public’s fears and lack of information to stop immigration.
Throughout 1940, the idea of Nazi espionage through refugees spread throughout the
United States. President Roosevelt fueled the suspicion and insecurity of the American
people when he gave significant attention to German infiltration of the United States.
The American press gave a significant amount of attention to this issue because of
Roosevelt’s earnest belief that the fifth column posed a serious threat to the United
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States. In the summer and fall of 1940, the New York World Telegram, Pittsburgh Press,
New York Post, and New York Journal American were among the papers that ran a series
of articles that detailed how the alleged fifth column gained power and functioned on a
large scale all across America. American Press evidence concluded that the fifth column
infiltrated countries in Europe such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, and France.
Their beliefs supported their theory United States was also being infiltrated. These were
not radical groups like Father Coughlin or the German-American Bund. On the contrary,
these were well-respected newspapermen that had a major audience during the 1940s.
Several articles in America made attempts to refute and even poke fun at these outrageous
allegations. However these attempts fell on deaf ears. The majority of the American
people believed what they read in the major publications. As seen in a Roper poll in July
of 1940, 71 percent of the respondents concluded that Germany had created an organized
fifth column in the United States. Almost three-fourths of the American people polled
believed this conclusion, making it a perfect example of the mind-set of the American
people in 1940. An article in the November issue of McCall’s showed in detail how
American preoccupation with the fifth column produced a nation of spy hunters, while a
Department of Justice spokesman declared the department’s most difficult job was to
deflate the espionage hysteria.6 The Attorney General’s office prepared a report that
stated the American press was more concerned with the fifth column than the war. This
showed the extent of the hysteria about the fifth column and how preoccupied the
American press and for that matter the American people were. The ease in which the
Nazis invaded Poland and France has to be considered in any discussion about the press’s
concern with this alleged threat. F.D.R.’s firm belief in the German fifth column did
little to curtail the fascination the American press had with it.
During 1940 anti-Semitism spread throughout the United States. Although most
Americans disagreed with Fascism and Nazism they were more receptive to antiSemitism. The American Institute of Public Opinion found that Father Charles Coughlin
and his radio show had amassed a large listening audience in which he attacked Jews on a
regular basis.7 Father Coughlin had an estimated listening audience of about 15 million

6
7

Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945, 130.
Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945, 127.

31

with a regular audience of three and half million. Sixty-seven percent of his regular
listeners approved of his violent anti-Semitic message while 51 percent of his occasional
listeners approved.8 The size of Coughlin’s audience and the fact that one-half to twothirds of his listeners agreed with him demonstrated that anti-Semitism grew from
specific groups to a broader portion of the population. The preaching of Nazis on one
side and Coughlinites and the German-American Bund members on the other had
convinced many Americans that their antipathy toward Jews and immigrants was
justified. In surveys taken from 1940 to1946 Jews were seen as a greater menace to the
welfare of the United States than any other national, religious, or racial group. The
American people held this opinion during the war years with the Nazis and Japanese. It
would have seemed more plausible that the Germans and Japanese were a greater threat
to the United States than anyone else. Jewish refugees were not seen as a humanitarian
concern for the American people, but rather as a threat.
Several voices of reason spoke out against the accusations that refugees served as
spies. The editors of The Nation and The New Republic were part of the liberal press that
wanted the State Department to prove some of the accusations leveled against refugees.
When the editors of The Nation challenged the State Department to prove a single
instance of coerced espionage with Jewish refugees, the State Department produced no
sufficient evidence to support this claim. A writer for The New Republic claimed that
prominent Nazis found few obstacles when they applied for admission into this country
while it was almost impossible for political refugees to receive admission. The journal
PM blamed Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long for this policy. Long was an
important figure in the refugee question and his policies will be discussed later on in
further detail. These were some of the few organizations, journals, or magazines to speak
out against the refugees as a spy theory. Since no evidence was brought forth to prove
this theory, these groups were on the right track. However, the press, radio, newsreels,
movies, books, churches, and patriotic groups generated the fears of the fifth columnists.
Every form of mass communication in the United States supported the theory of the
refugee as a spy.
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Up until 1940 Roosevelt was able to publicly keep out of the refugee issue. However,
this changed with the fifth column claim and the paranoia that went with it. In May of
1940, President Roosevelt transferred the Immigration and Naturalization Service from
the Labor Department to the Justice Department because he felt the Justice Department
could control the refugee situation more effectively.9 At a press conference Roosevelt
explained the move as necessary for national defense and to curtail sabotage and spying.
When the President concluded that this was a serious threat, so did the American public.
Congress did its part to help the President when it passed the Alienation Act of 1940.
The new law became commonly known as the Smith Act and it dealt with three issues.
These included the outlawing of certain submissive activities; the disloyalty of the
military forces and advocacy to overthrow the government by using force; and affiliation
with a group that advocated the forcible overthrow of the government. This law
expanded the grounds for deportation and required all aliens in the United States fourteen
and older to be fingerprinted and to register. The passing of this law, viewed as an
immense victory for the restrictionists, was the direct result of President Roosevelt’s fears
of the fifth column. A Roper Poll in the July issue of Fortune solidified the restrictionist
claim when it reported that 71 percent of its respondents believed that a German fifthcolumn existed. When President Roosevelt advocated passage of legislation that
potentially restricted immigration, he became publicly involved.
By late 1941 and early 1942, the news of massive numbers of Jews being massacred
in Poland leaked out to the United States. Because no one in the State Department
wanted to accept this information or for that matter was concerned with it, it was
investigated with caution. The main figure in the Roosevelt Administration in regard to
immigration was Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long a longtime friend of
Roosevelt’s who had served in the Roosevelt Administration since the New Deal.10 This
friendship with Roosevelt allowed Long to influence the President on immigration
policies and the implementation of stricter quotas on refugees. With the outbreak of
World War II, State Department officials created a special War Problems Division with
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Long at the head of this department.11 The crucial point of Long’s appointment was that
the new division that he was in charge of included the State Department’s visa section.
This meant that Long was in the position to make critical decisions in regard to refugees.
By 1943 he supervised 23 of the 42 divisions within the State Department related to
immigration. This was an immense amount of power for a man who had a questionable
opinion of Jews.
Breckinridge Long was a restrictionist from the 1930s, and he viewed immigrants as a
menace. Initially, he admired Hitler and Mussolini before the United States became
involved in the war. Long even went as far as to say that the Anshluss(Austrian
annexation) of 1938 was acceptable because the Germans were the only people with the
intelligence and courage to bring peace between the Rhine and Black Sea. In retrospect
this was an ominous signal to Jewish groups that Roosevelt and Long did not have a
favorable opinion of Jews and had no interest in any significant attempts of rescue. This
indifference proved fatal to refugee immigration during World War II.
With difficulty historians have tried to decide Long’s exact opinion of Jews. Long
was intelligent enough not to criticize Jews openly. His diary was introspective but never
really gave his definitive opinion on the subject. He was a typical bureaucrat of the times
resenting the intrusion of Jews into the upper echelons of public service during the New
Deal.12 Long never referred to Jews directly; he would use terms such as “New York
liberals” and he longed for the Wilson Administration that catered to wealthy America.
Long played the idea of refugees as security risks to the fullest. By 1941 he had
convinced the President that anyone with a relative under Nazi control was a security
risk. Long was a key component in building the “paper wall” that David Wyman used as
a metaphor to describe the State Department’s policy toward refugees. Another reason,
and probably the most important, was that Long held the assumption that communism
was linked to Jewish internationalism.13 Long distained the change of the status quo in
Washington politics and communism helped form his opinion of Jews. His inherent
misunderstanding of Jews fed on his fears of a communist takeover and formed his policy
11
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on immigration that was consistent with the rest of America public opinion during the
1930s and 1940s.
In July of 1941 the State Department again received negative attention when the
accusation of anti-Semitism within the Foreign Service was publicly questioned. This
was the division that Long was directly involved in. After Alfred Wagg was forced to
resign under mysterious circumstances for his involvement with the Dominican Republic
Settlement Association, he began a series of articles in the New Republic that claimed
anti-Semitism was widespread within the department. Long and Secretary of State
Cordell Hull prepared an acceptable explanation for Roosevelt which also convinced the
American public that the State Department had worked diligently at attempts to emigrate
refugees into the United States. Roosevelt, worried about his own political status did not
want to alienate Congress. With unresolved diplomatic problems with both Germany and
Japan he accepted the State Department’s conclusion and never really worried if its
reports were accurate. Only liberal publications such as the New Republic and The
Nation questioned State Department accounts. There were no public statements by the
prominent Jewish groups, and even Rabbi Stephen Wise was uncharacteristically silent
on the issue.
During 1941 Breckinridge Long gained absolute authority over refugee immigration
policies. His first order of business was to stop funding the Presidential Advisory
Committee on Political Refugees (PACPR) because it was in opposition to his restrictive
immigration policies.14 Long claimed that the committee members’ opposition to his
policies on immigration was an oversight. He then pressured the head of the PACPR,
James MacDonald, and Eleanor Roosevelt, the President’s wife, to correct his mistake.
When he pressed for consuls in occupied countries to decide whether visas were accepted
or rejected, it all but guaranteed that the visas would not be accepted. Long knew that
consuls in occupied countries were subject to removal by him, and then no one would be
able to decide a refugee’s fate in those countries without his approval. The policies that
he developed were so restrictive that in September 1941 of 985 applications received,
only 121 were accepted.15 By October 1941 of 9,500 visas applied for and only 4,800
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were cleared. This was an improvement but Long deliberately kept the process slow and
also kept State Department officials at odds with the Justice Department officials.
Attorney General Biddle was the only significant opposition to Long at this time. Long
compromised so that President Roosevelt could appoint two outside members to review
visa cases, but Long could reverse any decision that he deemed pertinent. This basically
did nothing to curtail Long’s power because he could view all cases as pertinent and deny
any visa that he wanted to. Breckinridge Long escaped his most serious threat to absolute
control of the refugee issue.
Long implemented his plans on how to keep immigration quotas low and refugee
entry into the United States at a minimum throughout 1941. Most historians agreed this
was the last year that the United States or any other interested country had a legitimate
chance to rescue any significant number of European Jews. Long effectively stopped
most efforts when he tightened immigration policies. Again, Roosevelt’s indifference to
the situation proved costly. He could have removed Long but he chose not to, basically
ignoring the problem. Because the United States had not yet entered the war, a rescue
plan was still a viable option. Because Roosevelt allowed Long to be his henchman, for
the lack of a better term, he escaped any kind of political backlash from liberal
sympathizers and Jewish groups. No one within the State Department gave Long any
type of significant resistance to his policies. Although Attorney General Biddle provided
nominal resistance to Long, there was nothing that amounted to any formidable
opposition.
The Jewish leaders in the United States are not without blame on this issue. By
remaining silent in regards to Long, they basically did not to draw any attention to
themselves. Again, the question must be asked if American Jews were unwilling to help
their European brethren, how could they have expected the State Department to help.
When the United States entered into World War II in December, the refugee question had
little significance to the Roosevelt Administration.
Almost single-handedly, Breckinridge Long ended refugee immigration into the
United States. There was one person in 1941 who reported to the American people what
transpired with European Jews in Vichy, France. The reports of Varian Fry, the
European Director of the Emergency Rescue Committee, wrenched the soul with
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accounts of what happened to European Jews in occupied France.16 However, neither
American nor French Government officials welcomed Fry, and he was often referred to
as a nuisance. With little or no support, Fry often used two types of policies to obtain
visas for refugees. He tried to convince French officials that the United States
government would not be pleased with denial of a refugee release, but if that did not
work he resorted to bribery.17 Fry stated that the French were more interested in the
Germans than the Americans because the Germans controlled two-fifths of France.
Therefore, bribery was the best way to get refugees released. A common example of the
difficulties that Fry encountered was when a German Jew applied for a visa with the
American Consul and was denied the visa. He was asked what he would do if someone
asked him to do something to aid German or Italian interests and he replied whatever was
in the best interest of the United States. The consul stated that the United States wanted
no one who would get involved in politics. In reality, whatever these refugee applicants
answered was wrong.
In a strange turn of events, when Fry mentioned that the Communists were the
strongest and most organized group in Vichy France, the State Department was given the
public support to end all immigration from France based on the fear that a refugee was a
Communist. Fry inadvertently hindered immigration when he wanted to increase it. Fry
was even more disillusioned with the Roosevelt Administration when he claimed its
decision was immoral. He stated that he felt abandoned by the United States when there
were thousands of refugees who needed help. The standard response from the State
Department after the outbreak of war was to place the refugee issue even further back on
the shelf. By the end of 1941 in the United States, there was the possibility of taking
212,000 refugees but only 150,000 or so were able to immigrate.18 By not allowing all
the allotted immigration places to be filled was an excellent example of the problems
rescue advocates faced in bringing refugees into the United States. At the last possible
time for the State Department to help refugees and get public opinion in favor of
supporting increased immigration only roughly 70 percent of the refugees were brought
16
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into the U.S. With this, the window of opportunity all but closed for refugees and the
Roosevelt Administration missed the best chance to help European Jews. To further
emphasize Roosevelt’s position of the immigration issue in June of 1941, he signed the
Bloom-Van Nuys bills that allowed the American foreign consulates to reject anyone
they concluded might be a threat to American society.19 Roosevelt played his political
hand perfectly because he could blame someone else if refugees were not admitted into
the United States. He again avoided directly being involved in the refugee issue.
By September 1941 Allied military officials heard reports about Jews being
exterminated in large numbers. The British military even received reports as early as
October 1941 that mass killings had taken place in the Soviet Union. The British
Government’s Code and Cypher School deciphered around twenty reports by the Nazi
Order Police that stated and described in detail the execution of some 45,000 Jews.20
This was sound proof and a first hand account of the killings. Because the U.S. had not
entered the war at this point, it can be deduced that the British did not share this
information with the United States. The British, up to this point, had shown minimal
interest in helping refugees. They did not share this information with the United States
and the White Paper Order in 1939 had closed relocation to Palestine.
By 1942 the situation for European Jews worsened and concentration camps were
transformed into extermination camps. The number of Jews who were deported and
killed was so immense that the Nazis were not able to hide the information from
intelligence agencies scattered throughout Europe. The Nazis now implemented the
“Final Solution”. Dr. Henry Shoskes, a prominent Jewish leader who had escaped from
Poland, reported to the Office of Strategic Services in Lisbon that an average of 10,000
Jews were killed monthly in the Polish ghettos.21 This first hand information from an
influential Jewish leader did not raise an eyebrow from the United States or other Allied
countries. Another impeccable source that reported information similar to Dr. Shoskes
was Edgar Salin. Salin, a professor of Economics and Sociology at the University of
Basle, uncovered a secret drop used by the Nazis in his garden that contained
19
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information that the Nazis had developed extermination camps in Poland and for
European Jews and Russian prisoners of war.22 Salin reported this information to the
BBC and stressed that they pass the information on to Roosevelt and Churchill. When
this information was actually reported, it never made front-page headlines. A report from
Lisbon’s Office of Strategic Services stated that Germans no longer persecuted Jews, but
in fact, had started to exterminate them. A British officer who escaped Nazi captivity
also presented information on extermination. The officer stated that Hitler wanted the
Jews eliminated with more expediency. This was at the time the Nazis implemented the
gas chambers to follow through on Hitler’s orders . These were two reports from
qualified people with first hand knowledge that were ignored by the United States.
Neither the State Department nor Roosevelt initiated a response or even any
acknowledgement of these reports.
The most important news of Jewish extermination was received in the summer of
1942. Dr. Gerhard Riegner, the head of the Geneva office of the World Jewish Congress,
reported that the Nazis planned to exterminate the Jews of Europe at one time.23 Riegner
iterated that the information could not be confirmed, but his informant had connections
with the highest Nazi authorities. Even though Riegner could not conclusively confirm
Nazi plans, his information came from a reliable source within the Nazi hierarchy.
Riegner sent details of the plans to prominent Jewish leaders in the United States and
Great Britain. Although, Rabbi Stephen Wise was sent the information, he did not
receive it for a couple of months. Whether this was intentional or not is not known.
Messages on Jewish issues being delayed within the State Department were standard
practice in 1942. When Rabbi Wise finally received this information, he immediately
brought it to the attention of Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. The State
Department, following the standard practice of the time, delayed the report pending
verification. With the report delayed in the State Department, publications such as
Newsweek, The New York Times and the Jewish Frontier ran accounts of the gas
chambers in the extermination camps.24 By now there was no way the Roosevelt
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Administration could ignore the report or justify the delay imposed by verification.
Before action could be taken on these reports, Rabbi Wise had to wait for State
Department verification. He was able to report to the New York Times, after at least a
month had passed, that two million Jews were dead. What was needed for U.S.
Government officials to take action on the Jewish situation?
Rabbi Wise was criticized when he remained silent until State Department officials
verified the report. This criticism was not completely justified and fair to Wise because
there were two political points he had to consider with this situation. The first was that
without State Department confirmation, the report was not considered credible.
Secondly, Wise needed to avoid a problem with the State Department because they were
in charge of rescue and without them European Jews had no chance.25 David Wyman
made the point that Jewish leaders placed immense criticism on Wise that was not
warranted. Although, The World Jewish Congress, the British Foreign Office, and many
prominent American Jewish leaders knew of the Riegner report, they did nothing to help.
Therefore, the blame for the delayed response to the report cannot be placed solely on
Rabbi Wise because other organizations could have pursued the issue. Wise was not the
only spokesperson for European Jews. It must be remembered too that most of the
European Jews were under Nazi control at this point and what could the United States
have really done to save them? Unless the Nazis agreed to release the Jews there was
nothing at this point that could have been done. Consequently, the time for action was
the years before 1942.
Along with the Riegner report in August of 1942, the Jewish Labor Bund smuggled a
report out of Poland about Jews being killed. This report was called the “gravediggers
report’ because three Jewish gravediggers escaped and gave their account to the Jewish
Polish underground. The report claimed that 700,000 Jews were killed at Chelmno in
Poland. However, we now know that these numbers were grossly exaggerated and this is
where credibility can be challenged. Even though the exact figures were overestimated,
the fact that any number of Jews were being systematically slaughtered should have
raised some form of concern. The only outcome of this report was the American affiliate
of the Jewish Labor Bund reported the account in their publication the Ghetto Speaks and
25
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so did the Workmen’s Circle Call and the Jewish Frontier. The American mass media
and most other Jewish organizations did not mention the “gravediggers report”. Jewish
leaders later stated that they did not think these accusations were true because they could
not conceive that this type of barbarism could occur in the 20th century.26 This was a
fairly common response among many Jewish leaders of the time when mass killings were
reported. Most people could not fathom that this was really happening to European Jews.
By the autumn of 1942 all major Jewish leaders throughout the world had received
information about the extermination camps.27 The major Jewish leaders were old and
promoted their own self-interest. The unwillingness of the Zionist and non-Zionist to
formulate a unified rescue plan severely limited their influence with Roosevelt.
Finally, in October of 1942 Myron Taylor, who was Roosevelt’s emissary to the
Vatican, reported to F.D.R. that he was convinced that the reported atrocities in France
and Poland were true.28 November of 1942 brought additional setbacks to rescue and
immigration of Jews. Jewish sympathizers received another blow in Congress when
conservative congressmen gained seats in both houses. This was not good for increased
immigration quotas because even liberal Democrats and Republicans never pressed to
increase immigration quotas significantly. When the conservatives gained strength, it
was guaranteed that immigration would not increase. With the increase in power by the
conservatives, Breckinridge Long now had even more support for his immigration
policies. His power was shown when Emmanuel Cellar, a Democrat from New York,
proposed a bill that allowed refugees in France to enter the United States. The proposal
went before the House Committee on Immigration but Long used his influence with the
committee to stop the bill. Long knew that President Roosevelt was not interested in
increased refugee immigration, and he noted in his diary that the word “persons” was the
problem because it meant refugees and the President could, but would not throw open the
doors.29 This statement was made by one of the highest-ranking members of the
Roosevelt Administration and the person who controlled immigration in the United
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States. President Roosevelt was the only person who had more influence than Long in
regard to implementing legislation on the refugee issue.
According to Newsweek, anti-Semitism was a definite factor in the strong opposition
received when the President requested a suspension of immigration laws during the war.
During this time, Newsweek was one of the few non-Jewish publications that saw antiimmigration laws as anti-Jewish laws. In retrospect, this writer feels that their
observation was justified. Although Breckinridge Long was the person who implemented
the barriers for immigration, some of the blame needs to be placed on Roosevelt.
President Roosevelt never made a statement on the extermination of European Jews
during his twice a week press conferences. Neither was he ever asked any questions
concerning the reported mass killings. Blame can be placed on the President, the State
Department, the American Press, and American Jewish leaders for the lack of attention
the mass killings received.
There were several opinion polls during 1942 about the Jewish situation in Germany.
In one poll in the United States in July of 1942 the question was asked, “Why do you
think Hitler took away the power of the Jews in Germany?” Twenty percent of the public
concluded that Hitler thought the Jews were too powerful, while 18 percent believed that
Hitler hated Jews, and 26 percent concluded that Hitler thought that Jews ran the German
economy.30 The reason the percentages were not higher was there were ten different
questions asked and the total reached 104 percent. The three questions that received the
greatest response among the public were questions on how Americans viewed Jews at
this time. Another poll taken in July of 1942 posed the question, “Do you think the Jews
have too much power and influence in this country?” Forty-four percent of the American
public polled answered yes, while 41 percent answered no, and 15 percent had no
comment.31 Almost half the people polled concluded that American Jews had too much
power in the United States. The point that tied these two polls together was that the
American public viewed Jews as too powerful in this country, and thus they perceived
that Hitler concluded they were too powerful in Germany. Although the American
government did not implement a state sponsored policy of extermination of the Jews as
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the Nazis did, they did nothing to alleviate their woes. In retrospect, we now know that
there was little the U.S. could have done.
By 1943, the American Jewish Congress headed by Rabbi Wise hoped that public
opinion within the United States had swung in their favor. While most Americans
believed that numerous European Jews had been killed, public opinion never drastically
changed. Jewish groups received little interest from government officials when it was
reported that atrocities had occurred. Sumner Welles, Breckinridge Long, Cordell Hull,
and President Roosevelt were not interested in any type of Jewish rescue. A perfect
example of the State Department’s attitude was when Gerhard Riegner and Richard
Lichtheim reported in early 1943 that 6,000 Jews per day were killed in Poland. Although
the State Department relayed this information to Rabbi Wise, they wanted no association
with this report.32 The State Department’s Division of European Affairs tried for months
to keep any information that leaked out about Jews under wraps. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull sent a telegram to the European Affairs Office to ignore a report that was to
be transmitted to private persons because it jeopardized the relationship with neutral
countries on confidential official matter. This was Cable 354 and it instructed Leland
Harrison to cease forwarding reports on mass murder.33 The State Department did
everything within its power to halt all information into the United States about European
Jews. Once the Riegner-Lictheim report reached the American Jewish Congress and
related organizations, the American press did little to spread the information to the
American public. A public opinion poll in January of 1943 showed that almost 50
percent of the Americans polled concluded that Jews had too much influence in the
business world.34 This was an increase from the poll in 1942, it can be deduced that
American public opinion had worsened instead of improved in regard to Jews. As the
situation for Jews in Europe worsened, American opinion of Jews declined with it.
In February 1943 a slight glimmer of hope was presented to European Jews when
Romania offered the United States and its allies a proposal to send 72,000 Jews from
Romania to Palestine or another allied port.35 Although this appeared to be a perfect
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solution to save Romanian Jews, Palestine was closed by the British in 1939 and
transporting this many people would have proved a daunting task for the U.S. The State
Department needed help from the British and did not receive it. The State Department
probably considered the event as a Nazi initiated distraction from the war effort.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau brought the proposal to Roosevelt. F.D.R.
referred him to Sumner Welles, who in turn dismissed the proposal. This was exactly
how every report on European Jews was handled in the State Department. President
Roosevelt passed the reports to individuals within the State Department who tried to help,
but the restrictionists in the State Department prolonged investigations and extended
responses for several weeks. The only paper that had any response to the Romanian
proposal was the New York Times. It could be surmised that this was a major
development. The fact of the matter was that the Romanian government tried to sell Jews
to the United States and the Allies. How can only one major publication in the United
States run this story? Even though the Romanian government offered this proposal to the
Americans and British, there was really nothing either government could do. The Allies
did not have control of North Africa at this point and this was their priority. The rescue
of European Jews was not. The Allies looked at the plight of European Jews through the
eyes of the war. The Allies had not secured any significant ground against the Nazis, so
rescue was not a viable option at this point.
American Jewry in 1943 did not sit idly by as the government deliberated over what to
do about European Jews. Rabbi Wise and prominent American Jewish groups organized
the Joint Escape Committee and organized a rally in New York City. At this rally Jewish
leaders developed eleven ways the United States could rescue European Jews, and they
sent a copy to every prominent government official.36 This was the first time that all the
American Jewish groups organized into one group and formulated one protest. The
Nation and New Republic responded to the Jewish protest and again supported the Joint
Emergency Committee’s ideas for rescue. In keeping with its usual stance, the State
Department had no response to the proposals. The Joint Emergency Committee focused
on two points in 1943. The first was public formal protests against United States rescue
policy and to get the United States Congress to make a public statement of their support
36
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for rescue. However, the Joint Emergency Committee did not get Congress to issue a
public statement on rescue. David Wyman stated that Congress agreed that the
perpetrators deserved to be punished, but there was no mention of rescue. This attitude
was common during this time. Most officials believed that punishment was in order, but
no one ever mentioned any rescue efforts. Most officials concluded that rescue was not
attainable nor a desired response.
By the spring of 1943 the State Department was still in the process of deciding what to
do in regards to Jewish rescue. The State Department and now the British government
viewed any attempted rescue not only as a burden and danger but also as something that
should be avoided. In retrospect, Hitler was not going to negotiate on this issue, but the
United States and the Allies did not know this for certain in 1943. A prime example of
Roosevelt’s non-public response to the refugee crisis was when Rabbi Wise and several
members of the Joint Emergency Committee asked to meet with Roosevelt. The White
House received this message and relayed it to the State Department, which refused the
meetings saying that they and Roosevelt were not interested. Secretary of State Hull
denied the request for this meeting, and this was how he typically operated on all Jewish
refugee questions. Seven Jewish congressmen led by Emmanuel Celler did obtain a
meeting with Roosevelt about this time. Oddly, the congressmen did not press the
President on rescue issues but rather focused on loosened immigration restrictions and
increased immigration to reach the amount allotted by the quotas.37 Again, this was an
opportune time for these congressmen to press Roosevelt hard on this issue and they did
not. When the congressmen emphasized the subject of immigration restriction, Roosevelt
was able to divert them to Long. Long held strong to his restrictionist and anti-Semitic
beliefs and did nothing. Roosevelt seemed to only take an interest in European Jews
when American Jewish leaders confronted him. American Jewry along with State
Department officials should take a considerable amount of blame because they let an
enormous opportunity slip away.
Roosevelt made one attempt to facilitate a Jewish rescue mission in 1943 when he
organized the Bermuda Conference for discussion on Jewish rescue with Allied countries.
The conference met with fierce opposition by Breckinridge Long. Long exercised his
37
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authority and influence when he tried to control the direction of the conference by
selecting members of his committee such as R. Borden Reams who viewed the refugee
situation in the same light he did.38 This time Long faced fierce resistance because both
the American and British governments needed to bring home or attempt to bring home a
solid plan of rescue because they could no longer publicly deny the seriousness of the
Nazi intentions toward European Jews. Credible publications, such as the New York
Times, reported the atrocities and by even having the Bermuda Conference both countries
admitted that the reports were factually credible.
Both the British and the Americans agreed that a rescue attempt in occupied Europe
was not feasible, so they decided to reestablish the Intergovernmental Committee on
Political Refugees. The British were not easily sold on the idea until Long used his
influence to reestablish the committee. With Long as the chief architect of the
committee, this allowed the State Department to slowly diminish the committee’s
effectiveness. It was understood that the Intergovernmental Committee on Political
Refugees was to be the instrument the Allies used to save the refugees. In fact, it was a
calculated plan by Long to form a committee that would go through the motions of rescue
and not actually do anything.39 The power that the State Department gave Long over
immigration insured there would be nothing done for European Jews.
The idea of Jews being relocated to North Africa was discussed in enormous detail at
the Bermuda Conference, but this idea was soon dropped because of the perceived
problem of Jews being placed in an area heavily populated with Muslims. It was also
proposed that Jewish refugees be placed in Latin America, but this too did not develop.
The State Department used the Nazi spy threat to their security and convinced Latin
American countries to close their doors. The Bermuda Conference concluded that the
fastest way to rescue the Jews was to win the war and nothing was to interfere with that
goal. As sad and unsatisfying as this conclusion was, it proved to be correct. Although,
the Bermuda Conference was noble in theory, it had no credible plan of rescue. The
Germans controlled the continent of Europe in 1943. Therefore, even if North Africa was
a feasible place to relocate the Jews, where were the Jews going to come from to
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emigrate? Breckinridge Long ensured that the Bermuda Conference would not succeed
when he sent Sol Bloom, Chair of House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senator Scott
Lucas, assistant majority leader in the Senate, to represent the United States.40 Both of
these men were ademant restrictionists that had no intention of helping rescue European
Jews. The one good event of the Bermuda Conference was that it was the start of the
demise of Long. However, it was regrettable that under Long’s leadership pre-war
opportunities had been missed for rescue that could not be regained.
American and world Jewry believed that the purpose of the Bermuda Conference was
for the Americans and the British to develop a strategic plan to rescue European Jews.
This was not the case, and it did not take long for American and British Jewry to
conclude that this conference was for public opinion only. When the Bermuda
Conference ended, most government officials knew that mass killings of Jews had taken
place in the concentration camps since this was no longer a secret, and the Conference
did address the needs of the European Jews. Representative Celler was one of the most
vocal critics of the Conference and called it, “A fiasco like the Evian Conference and a
diplomatic mockery that betrayed human interests and ideas.”41 Rabbi Stephen Wise
made public his disbelief and anger with the State Department, stating that again they had
done nothing to help rescue efforts. The United States was even more engulfed in World
War II that afforded Roosevelt little inclination toward refugee rescue. Even if Rabbi
Wise had been able to discuss with Roosevelt how the Conference proceeded, there was
no real chance to save any significant number of Jews by this point. The only
information that Roosevelt received on rescue efforts was through Secretary of State Hull
via Breckinridge Long. Long reported inaccurate numbers and information to the
President. For example, he reported to Roosevelt that from 1933 to 1943 that the United
States had allowed 580,000 refugees to immigrate.42 The actual number was closer to
half of this. Roosevelt accepted these reports without question, and he continued to allow
people with restrictionist and anti-Semitic tendencies, such as Long, Hull, and Senator
Reynolds, to control American immigration.
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Several important groups and ideas came to light from the Bermuda Conference. The
Bergson Group, a militant Zionist group that supported a full-scale rescue of the Jews,
took out a full-page ad that denounced the State Department’s policy on rescue. This
group was short lived because they used thirty-three Senator’s names without consent,
and several of these Senators publicly denied any association with the group. The
Bergson Group did get the public’s attention with the ad and brought to light that the
Bermuda Conference made a mockery of a rescue effort. The idea to make Palestine a
home for refugee Jews was discussed seriously at the Conference. American Zionists
concluded that this was the appropriate solution to the problem. The problem with this
plan was that Palestine and the countries that bordered it were predominately Muslim.
The Egyptian Minister, Mahmoud Hassan Bey, warned the State Department that if they
and the Zionists continued to press for Palestine relocation, conflict was imminent.43 The
State Department in 1943 never conceived that Palestine was a viable option because of
the British White Paper Order of 1939. Most members of the State Department wanted to
wait until the end of the war to determine relocation and address the plight of the Jews.
However, the State Department underestimated the Zionist influence on American Jewry,
and by 1943 the Palestine option was perceived as an attainable option. American Jewry
was divided into Zionists and non-Zionists. This caused disunity within American Jewry,
the most important group pressing the rescue effort was divided. This problem plagued
American Jewry throughout the 1940s because there was no unified effort to fight
German persecution of Jews. This lack of unity within American Jewry with the Zionist
focusing on a Jewish state after the war instead of rescue made it easier for Cordell Hull
and Breckinridge Long to procrastinate when it came to rescue efforts.
Several other obstacles were implemented by the State Department in 1943 to restrict
immigration. The time required to screen applications was increased to nine months.44
There was no apparent reason for this increase in time other than to delay applications as
long as possible. Long was continually criticized by proponents of rescue because the
visa application was more than four feet long and had to be filled out on both sides by
one of the refugee’s sponsor, sworn under the penalty of perjury and submitted in six
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copies. They surmised that the only reason for this kind of detail was to delay the
application process and discourage attempted immigration. The sponsors’ backgrounds
were checked along with their references. The process checked background information
from the sponsors past ten years, which took several months to complete.
In 1943 State Department officials added the provision that the refugee had to be in
acute danger before a rescue attempt was a reasonable option. This virtually allowed the
State Department to close its doors at will because it claimed that no one who applied for
visas was in danger. The group that saved immigration from complete shutdown was the
Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals overruled about one-fourth of the negative
recommendations made by the visa review board. Without the Board of Appeals,
immigration into the United States would not have existed. In 1941 47.5 percent of the
quota was used, in 1942 only 19 percent of the quota was used, and by 1943 the Axis
nations had limited immigration to the U.S. to 9.8 percent of the allotted quota. This was
a significant decrease in the number of recommendations from the previous two years.
Even with the positive work of the Board of Appeals, the restrictionists, nativists, and
anti-Semites in the State Department along with German occupation of most of Europe
had successfully decreased immigration to an almost non-existent level.
Although the Bermuda Conference in 1943 did not solve the refugee immigration
problem to any significant extent, by 1944 the political pressure placed on President
Roosevelt forced him to take an active role in regard to the refugee question. There was
no way to hide from the American public and Congress what had happened to the Jews in
occupied Europe. President Roosevelt enacted Executive Order 9417 that created the
War Refugee Board.45 The premise of the War Refugee Board was to get the State,
Treasury, and War Departments to provide whatever support the board needed to help
with refugee immigration. In theory this board was an excellent idea and had it been
used in accordance with its designed purpose, it very well could have helped. The State
and War Departments found ways around the Board and provided a minute amount of
help to the Board. A stipulation that hindered the War Refugee Board was that these
departments were required to help so long as it did not interfere with war operations.
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This in effect eliminated the War Department’s help because their main focus was on
winning the war.
The State Department was still under the guidance of Cordell Hull, and this board did
nothing to change his view of refugee rescue. In fact, the men Hull appointed had very
little time to devote to the board, and they did nothing to stop the opposition of mid-level
State Department officials. All of the rescue efforts that Roosevelt supported involved
the same people who opposed any kind of real rescue effort. Although he did support
some sort of rescue effort the people he placed in charge did not. The Treasury
Department under the leadership of Henry Morgenthau was the only department that met
their full responsibility with respect to the War Refugee Board. The Treasury
Department housed the Board and provided most of the staff that was needed, and
Morgenthau took an active role in this operation. Morgenthau was the highest ranked
cabinet member that took an active role in rescue. The others, such as Cordell Hull and
Breckinridge Long succeeded in hindering and opposing every action that might have
helped a rescue effort. Without Morgenthau, the War Refugee Board would have
dissolved like the other rescue efforts.
Another problem that hampered the War Refugee Board was the miniature staff that
was funded for such a large-scale project. The Board at its highest number had no more
than 30 members, and most of the time the board revolved around 12 persons who were
mostly gentiles and veterans of the Treasury Department that battled with State
Department officials over rescue efforts. First and foremost, a rescue effort on this scale
needed more than twelve to thirty members. Also, it can be concluded that American
Jews should have been more prevalent on this board. While the War Refugee Board was
in theory an excellent way to help refugees, in reality it was understaffed and under
supported by the government. In Breckinridge Long’s final months as a policy maker for
rescue, he stated that the War Refugee Board was just Jewish propaganda and they could
not have saved any more Jews than his policy did.46 Until his demise within the State
Department, Long maintained his restrictionist and anti-Semitic stance on refugee rescue.
It is obvious these restrictionists were the people that should have been removed from a
prominent position within the State Department long before 1944.
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Henry Morgenthau won a substantial victory for the War Refugee Board when he
recommended John Pehle as chair to President Roosevelt.47 Subsequently, Roosevelt
accepted Pehle as chair and action by the Board was underway. The first major situation
that faced Pehle and the Board was the Hungarian Jewish dilemma. At this time the
Jewish population in Hungary was the third largest in Europe and the Nazis placed them
on the liquidation list.48 By 1944 the Nazis realized that they could not win the war and
there were 800,000 Jews in Hungary who lived unprotected in the heart of German
occupation. Also, by this time the Allies knew about the “Final Solution” and Hungarian
Jews were next on the Nazis liquidation lists. The War Refugee Board tried to implement
a rescue plan for the Hungarian Jews, but with a small staff and no physical presence in
Hungary this was virtually impossible. Although Hungary was an ally of the Nazis, they
did not occupy the country until March 1944. By 1944, under pressure from the
Germans, the Hungarian government allowed the deportations of Jews to begin. The War
Refugee Board tried in vain to get the Hungarian government to disassociate itself from
the Nazis and not cooperate in the deportation of the Jews. The Board concluded that
without Hungarian help the Nazis would not be able to deport Jews on such a large scale.
Pehle and the rest of the board were not under the illusion that they could save a large
number of Jews, but any saved was better than none. Roosevelt reinvolved himself with
the refugee issue when he warned the Hungarian government that people who did not
help the Jews faced retribution after the war.49
This seemed to have little effect on the deportation, but it was significant that
Roosevelt promised retribution without the consent of the British. Prior to this both
countries typically issued joint statements with respect to retribution. Some felt that the
political pressure at home was the reason for Roosevelt’s threat. This argument had merit
because it seemed that Roosevelt in the past had only acted on this issue when he was
politically pressed. If it had been a moral issue for him, he had had ample opportunity
before American involvement in World War II to rescue European Jews. The Board
attempted a small-scale physical rescue in Hungary when they implemented a plan that
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liberated 2,000 Jews when they were sent to Romania. The War Refugee Board worked
with limited funds and manpower, but this did not deter them from at least an attempt at
rescue.
During 1944 Samuel Grafton, a popular columnist for the New York Post, developed
an idea that by-passed the immigration laws implemented by Breckinridge Long.
Grafton, with the complete support of the War Refugee Board, created the idea of “free
ports” in the United States that would harbor refugees until something permanent could
be done for them. This idea, which would buy pro-rescuers time, was an ingenious way
around the existing laws. Oddly enough, Grafton developed his idea from Breckinridge
Long, who allowed unfriendly aliens from Latin American into the United States as nonquota immigrants. Grafton and Pehle argued that European Jews should be allowed to
immigrate based on the same idea. This was the basis of the “free port” idea. President
Roosevelt was a reluctant participant because 1944 was an election year, and the
restrictionists were not supportive of the “free port” idea. Henry Morgenthau influenced
the President on this issue, but Roosevelt pointed out that he expected European countries
to take the majority of the refugees.50 Roosevelt was cautious at this point making sure
that the restrictionists knew that Europe was expected to participate so that the war effort
was not compromised.
In a predictable reaction in the 1940s, the War Department and the State Department’s
Visa Division opposed this temporary haven for refugees and even several members of
the War Refugee Board were opposed to this idea. Persuading passage of the “free ports”
temporary solution would take all of the political persuasion Morgenthau and Pehle could
devise. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson stated that the President had no power to act
unilaterally on an issue that affected a large portion of the American public. Powerful
people within Roosevelt’s Administration were strong in opposition to the “free port”
concept. Pehle, along with the New York Times, pleaded for public support for this idea.
The Times stated that this proposal did not open the floodgates to unrestricted
immigration, but it was the intention of the War Refugee Board to save innocent people
from dying. Roosevelt was very cautious on this issue, and even avoided taking a stand
on a congressional debate on this issue. The restrictionists were furious over this and
50
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they protested loudly. Robert Reynolds, who was referenced earlier, was a friend and
supporter of Long’s immigration policy and he asked Attorney General Francis Biddle
how the President received the authority to enact this executive order? In an ironic twist
Biddle, replied that when Breckinridge Long admitted unfriendly aliens from Latin
America, he had set the precedent.51 Long tried to cease all immigration into the United
States but in actuality gave Roosevelt a loophole to enact the “free port” act.
In the State Department there was an immense amount of opposition to rescue efforts,
but there was also disagreement within American Jewry that did little to help with rescue
efforts. The Zionist and non-Zionist Jews were always in conflict on the fate of the
European Jews after the war. It was difficult for people such as John Pehle and Henry
Morgenthau to initiate any kind of effective action. Because of the lack of a united
Jewish front with respect to rescue efforts, American Jewry carried some of the burden
for lack of a systematic rescue effort. In 1944 two Jewish leaders, Laurence Steinhardt
and Ira Hirshcman, stepped to the forefront and convinced other countries such as Turkey
to be a haven to Jews. Rabbi Stephen Wise publicity applauded Hirschmann for his work
in Turkey and Pehle used the publicity that Hirschmann created to promote the Board’s
cause. The significance of Rabbi Wise’s public adulation of Hirschmann was that
Hirschmann was associated with the rival Jewish group to Wise, the Emergency
Committee. The fact that two prominent, American Jewish groups were rivals further
hampered rescue efforts. Millions of their religious brothers and sisters perished at the
hands of the Nazis while these groups competed with each other. If he praised him, that
should have helped relations. This was another example of how American Jewry failed
the Jews in Europe. Did they expect the American public, with a strong majority of
gentiles, to support their efforts if they did not support each other? The disunity amongst
American Jewry caused unneeded delays in rescue within the United States.
Several public opinion polls conducted in 1944 revealed that the majority of the
American public did not grasp the extent of the extermination. One poll in December
1944 found that a majority of Americans believed that Hitler was cruel to Jews but they
were unaware of the extent of the cruelty. Another poll in December 1944 showed that
almost half of the Americans concluded that Jews were a nationality not a religious
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group.52 These surveys demonstrated two critical points. First, was that the American
public had no idea what the Nazis were actually doing to European Jews. Secondly,
Americans, along with Hitler, viewed Jews as a race not a religion. An analysis of these
surveys indicate that 12 % of the American public believed the stories of mass murder
were untrue, while 27 % percent surmised that the murder total was only 100,000 and
only 4 % believed that five million Jews had been eliminated.53 These percentages
showed that the vast majority of Americans had no idea what was going on in Eastern
Europe during World War II. No matter how many times it was reported, the magnitude
of the Holocaust never sank in with the majority of Americans. Even if the American
public believed these reports, would they have cared? Since World War II raged in
Europe and with Japan, the refugees were not on the minds of the public at large.
The War Refugee Board and American Jewry did warrant considerable blame but the
State and War Departments offered miniscule help. In addition, the Russians and British
did very little to help plus Roosevelt’s interest appeared to be politically motivated when
it publicly helped him.54 The War Refugee Board efforts were severely compromised by
the lack of cooperation it received and its inability to physically move the refugees to a
safe haven.
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CHAPTER 4
THE DEBATE OVER THE BOMBING OF AUSCHWITZ
In April 1944 the United States and the Allied countries received conclusive proof
that the concentration camp in Auschwitz, Poland did in fact exist. The more appropriate
term for Auschwitz was “death camp” instead of concentration camp because everyone
there was scheduled to die. Two reports in June of 1944 gave proof without a shadow of
doubt that Auschwitz was a death camp. The reports were known as the Verba-Wetzler
report and the Mordowicz-Rosin reports.1 Both of these reports were from men who
escaped from Auschwitz at different times but gave the same horrendous account of the
camp. Two of these men saw the preparation for the killing while the other two actually
saw the slaughter take place. This was credible first-hand knowledge of the camp from
four people who had just escaped. There were hints of the mass killings at Auschwitz
throughout the war, but the Allies did not take these reports seriously. With first-hand
accounts of the preparations and the killings, the United States and the Allies could no
longer ignore what took place in Auschwitz and the camps in eastern Poland. Gerhard
Riegner realized very quickly from the reports out of Geneva that the Nazis were killing
Jews in massive numbers. He immediately telegraphed the BBC and tried to alert the
world to what had taken place at Auschwitz and Birkenau. The Riegner telegram reached
London and was sent to Elizabeth Wiskemann who was an expert on eastern European
affairs.2 She immediately sent this information to Alan Dulles who was head of
intelligence for the United States in Switzerland. In a response that exemplified the
United States’ reaction to European Jews throughout the 1930s and 1940s Dulles sent this
information to the American Minister in Berne instead of the State Department or the
War Refugee Board. Dulles seemed unconcerned with this report and the American
Minister did not forward the message to Washington for almost two weeks.
The debate that raged at the time was the focused on whether the reports were
believable. Because the Vrba-Wetzler report was supported by the Mordowicz-Rosin
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report, the groups that supported rescue efforts concluded these reports needed to be
given immediate attention. Large numbers of Hungarian Jews were sent to the
Auschwitz-Birkeanu camps during this time. Everyone sent to these camps was told they
were under a six-month quarantine, which in reality meant they were to be gassed within
six months. The information had spread throughout Allied Europe about Auschwitz, but
Allied commanders did not consider these reports an urgent matter. The two telegrams
relayed from the World Jewish Congress and other European rescue organizations that
reached the War Refugee Board in the United States urged for the bombing of railway
lines in Kosice and Pesov.3 The Kosice and Presov railways were the two closest to
Auschwitz and the most important because these were the only rail lines into the camps
that were not in battle zones.
Almost a month passed before these telegrams reached the State Department. John
Pehle was asked to use his influence on this issue and to get urgent attention placed on it.
Pehle visited Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, who was placed in command of
the War Refugee Board, to discuss the feasibility of bombing these railways.
Uncharacteristically, Pehle had serious doubts about the effectiveness of bombing these
railways and made his feelings evident to McCloy. Pehle stressed to McCloy that he was
not requesting that any action be taken by the War Department on this matter other than
the exploration of the subject. Pehle was one of the staunchest supporters of Jewish
rescue efforts in the State Department and he questioned the practicality of railway
bombing. The War Department considered the bombing impracticable and they refused
to bomb anything they did not deem viable to military operations. The leadership in the
United States government concluded that the only way to save the Jews was to defeat
Germany. Even if Allied commanders had deemed Auschwitz-Birkenau a feasible
military target in June 1944, the earliest that bombing could have begun was July or
August. We have now have learned that the Nazis had, for the most part, stopped gassing
by this point. The evidence that was available clearly showed that the United States and
the Allies knew about Auschwitz and the purpose of the camp. Although the State and
War Department’s knew the purpose of the camps, they concluded that high altitude
bombing was too inaccurate and the collateral damage of killing Jewish prisoners was too
3
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significant of a risk. Also, keep in mind that the Normandy invasion was underway and
all the resources that the Allies had were given to this operation.
The State Department and the American military supported the War Department’s
position by stating that the bombing of Auschwitz was not feasible or militarily possible
in 1944. In retrospect, the evidence indicated that bombing was possible because the
United States had bombed targets within a twenty-mile range of Auschwitz throughout
1944. Contrary to what the American military stated to the War Refugee Board and
Jewish groups, the 15th Air Force based in Italy had the capability of carrying out
successful raids throughout 1944. In fact, the 15th Air Force flew two missions in June
and July of 1944 that crossed directly over the five railway lines into Auschwitz. On
June 26, 71 heavy bombers flew directly over one of the railway lines and were within
thirty miles of the other two. Then on July 7, 452 bombers traveled along and crossed
over the other two railroads.4 The argument over the feasibility of being able to reach
Auschwitz had no credibility after these reports. It was easily ascertained that at the very
least three of the five railroads could have been neutralized as deportation vehicles. Also,
there were several oil refineries within fifty miles of Auschwitz. In 1944 the destruction
of these installations became the main focus of the 15th Air Force. Auschwitz was in the
direct flight path of the 15th Air Force on their way to bomb these refineries. Again, the
State Department and the U.S. military concluded they were not militarily beneficial to
the war effort.
In recent years several discoveries and events have refuted the above argument for
bombing. The first was the Normandy invasion with all available resources allocated to
it, second was the ineffectiveness of bombing railway lines, third was that the Germans
had all but stopped gassing prisoners by this time, and the fourth was the fear that bombs
would kill more Jewish prisoners than it would save. In defense of pro-bombing attempts
reasons two and three are discoveries that were made after the war. Allied commanders
did not know that railway bombing was ineffective and that the gassing of prisoners was
almost non-existent by this time. As far as the Allies knew the gassings continued until
the end of the war.
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In August of 1944, 127 bombers dropped over 1,500 pounds of high explosives on
factories that were within five miles of the Auschwitz gas chambers. The Allied planes
were only five miles away from the gas chambers, but it was militarily impossible to
bomb them. According to the records, the weather conditions were perfect for bombing
and the American and British planes faced almost no opposition from either the
concentration camp defenses or the Luftwaffe. Because the Luftwaffe had become
ineffective at this point, they could not formulate a viable resistance to the Allies.
Consequently, the argument that the risk of losing valuable military war planes at
Auschwitz-Birkenau had no merit. On August 7, over 400 heavy bombers dropped
bombs on Blechhammer and Trezbinia and these targets were within thirteen miles of
Auschwitz. Throughout August of 1944 Auschwitz and the area around it was under
heavy Allied attack. The War Department had the audacity to state that the only way it
was possible to bomb Auschwitz was to divert airpower from operations elsewhere.
However, since Allied bombing operations took place all around Auschwitz this
statement was completely false. No operational plans needed to be changed to bomb the
gas chambers. A case in point was that on September 13, 1944, the Allies bombed areas
close to Auschwitz and received no opposition from the Luftwaffe. They did not attempt
to bomb any of the gas chambers. Inadvertently, two bombs veered off course and hit
near Auschwitz. These were the only two bombs the Allies dropped on AuschwitzBirkenau throughout the war.
By the middle of 1944, the Germans gave little resistance to Allied aerial bombing.
This was the main argument of the United States military against intense bombing of
Auschwitz. The United States and the Allies were concerned with losing heavy bombers.
Two other alternatives to heavy bombers were available to Allied forces at this time.
Mitchell medium range bombers were available, more accurate than the heavy bombers,
and the Lightning P-38 dive-bombers.5 Both of these aircrafts proved accurate and
capable of traveling long distances. There were refueling capabilities on the island of
Vis, which was 110 miles closer than the 15th Air Force’s air base in Foggia, Italy.
Obviously, this was an option the Allies did not try to explore. The argument that the
only way to save the Jews was to win the war was echoed time and time again when the
5
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War Refugee Board proposed bombing. In retrospect, the best possible time for the
United States and the Allies to bomb Auschwitz was from March through July of 1944.
One might argue that the Allies did not know about that Auschwitz was an extermination
camp until June of 1944. That was when the camp was confirmed to be a death camp by
the Verba-Wetzler report. The Allies had suspected that Auschwitz-Birkenau was a
death camp for some time. Roosevelt stated on March 24 of 1944, after the Nazis had
established a puppet government in Hungary and less than two months before the
deportations began, that the wholesale systematic murder of Jews in Europe went
unabated by the hour. If F.D.R. concluded that European Jews were being murdered, it is
reasonable to assume that the Allies did also. The mass killings would have continued
but not on as large a scale as before had the bombings taken place. No one knows how
many lives this could have saved if the Allies had acted in March 1944 after Roosevelt’s
statement. The United States had the military capability to destroy these gas chambers
but chose not too. The War Department developed the same attitude that the State
Department developed when they considered rescue a burden instead of an option to save
lives. The argument that bombing Auschwitz jeopardized military interests had no merit
when the aforementioned facts were brought forth.
Another supporter of the idea that the bombing of Auschwitz-Birkenau was feasible
was Dino Brugioni. Brugioni was a member of a bomber crew during World War II and
had a first-hand account of the atrocities Nazis committed towards Jews. It was an
interesting point that Brugioni flew bomber missions during the war and knew how
important aerial reconnaissance was to bombing raids, but he had no idea that pictures
were taken of the camps. After the war, he worked for the CIA and helped found the
National Photographic Interpretation Center that interprets aviation photography,
including military photographs.6 Brugioni said that he was interested in researching to
see if any aerial photographs were taken of the death camps during bombing raids of
World War II. His interest was piqued even further when he remembered that during all
raids the cameras on board were turned on and he knew that on several raids on the I.G.
Farben plant the raiders flew over the Birkenau death camp. With the help of an
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associate, Brugioni obtained film that was taken on the missions to the Farben plant.
Much to his surprise, they discovered that many pictures were taken of both Auschwitz
and Birkenau and these photographs were completely overlooked in 1944 and 1945. One
problem with Brugioni’s statement is that the photographs were not developed until after
the war. This could go to the argument of the Allies lack of interest in the camps.
Roosevelt stated in March 1944 that European Jews were being murdered and the Allies
knew that Hungarian Jews were being transported to Auschwitz-Birkenau. The VerbaWetzler report confirmed that the camps were extermination camps. If the Allies were
committed to saving European Jews, why were the photographs not developed? It is
reasonable to deduce that Allied commanders with the 15th Air Force knew that their
bombers were flying over the camps.
With this discovery Brugioni was perplexed by several images that were clear in the
photos and overlooked by the Allied commanders. Brugioni along with other historians
pondered how the Allies did not notice the unusually large size of Birkenau that was not
typical of concentration camps. The unusually large numbers of boxcars at Birkenau
when there were little, if any, industrial installations at the camp, and the four separately
secured extermination areas that included an undressing room, a gas chamber, and a
crematorium. These were questions to which no one had a legitimate answer.

The

pictures were available to Allied commanders in 1944 and 1945, but they did not deem
them necessary enough to develop.
Brugioni concluded that five factors influenced Allied policy during the bombing of
Germany; these were Tasking, Priority Projects, Training, Precedence, and Photo
Interpretation Equipment.7 The first, Tasking, was a military term that meant the
formulation of intelligence information on enemy targets. Tasking was used for military
targets that were considered a priority. Concentration and extermination camps were
never considered a priority by the military so Tasking was not used for them. The target
sheet on Auschwitz focused on the I.G. Farben fuel and rubber plant and never mentioned
Auschwitz I and Birkenau. These targets were known to military officials, but they did
not consider them significant because they were not trained to look for extermination
camps. Priority was not given to the death camps during this time because the Normandy
7
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and southern France invasions were underway. Consequently, the argument to give the
camps priority was difficult to defend. The invasion of France was of greater military
significance than bombing the concentration camps.
In aerial reconnaissance the major problem was the lack of training the interpreters
received on distinguishing between concentration and extermination camps.8 The
interpreters only received a four to six week training course, which concentrated on
military equipment such as airplanes, tanks, artillery, and ships. The interpreters received
insufficient training in the differentiation between the types of camps, and the only camps
that they were specifically trained to detect were the ones that contained American
prisoners. Jewish prisoner camps were not considered a priority in their training. The
fourth factor identified by Brugioni was Precedence. This factor relied heavily on
knowledge that already existed of the target. Studying the photoreconnaissance of the
chambers and the crematoriums, Brugioni found no reference for interpreters to use in the
identification of these types of installations. The interpreters cannot be blamed because
they were not trained to identify this type of installation. The U.S. military and the State
Department officials are too blame because they knew the extermination camps existed as
early as 1942. Another problem faced by the interpreters was that they worked secluded
from most other military communication. Had they known about the Vrba-Wetzler
report, they could have found and pinpointed the gas chambers and crematoria. This
information was not relayed from the top to the interpreters at ground zero. The
argument that bombing was useless because gassing had stopped by this time is irrelevant
because the Allies did not know that the killings had stopped. We know that now but the
Allies had no idea in the summer of 1944. It is easy to excuse non-bombing when it is
looked at in retrospect. The point that cannot be emphasized enough was that the Allies
did not know that the killings had stopped.
The final obstacle to action referenced by Brugioni was Photo Interpretation.
Brugioni pointed out that during World War II the magnification of photographs were not
as in depth as they are today. Most images were magnified four to seven times as
compared to 35 or more times today. Although magnification was not as developed as
today, Brugioni concluded this was not a reasonable excuse for the lack of action. Photo
8
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interpretation was critical for bombing raids. The Allies deemed the photoreconnaissance
of Auschwitz-Birkenau was not critical enough to be studied during the war. Without
photo-interpretation Allied bombers had minimal chance at bombing the crematoriums.
The problem with aerial interpretation was not only in the interpreters and quality of
film but also with Allied air commanders acknowledging that photos of AuschwitzBirkenau existed. It seemed the Allied air commanders were the only people with access
aerial information but they supposedly did not know about the camps, the roads, and
rivers around the Auschwitz. Winston Churchill and subordinates to Roosevelt, such as
John J. McCloy, Cordell Hull, and John Pehle knew all about the camps. How could the
Allied air commanders not know? It boiled down to the simple fact that they did not
consider the camps to be of strategic, military value and used the excuse of not being able
to divert valuable military resources. Not withstanding the fact that the Allies flew
directly over Birkenau on their way to the Farben plant. For instance, the 15th Air Force
in Italy sent pictures to the Allied Central Interpretation Unit in Medenham, England that
contained information about Auschwitz-Birkenau. Medenham was fifty miles outside of
London and easily accessible to the Allies if they had so chosen to obtain aerial photos of
the camps. Lack of accessible and credible information was not an acceptable defense.
Roosevelt’s son was commander of the Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance
Wing in Italy. The aerial information about the camps could have very easily reached
Roosevelt or at least Secretary of War Stimson and from there to John J. McCloy.
Two major critics of the proposed bombing of Auschwitz-Birkenau were James H.
Kitchens III and Richard H. Levy. Both of these men argued vigorously that bombing
the gas chambers and crematoriums was neither feasible nor would it have been effective.
Kitchens strongly argued that any Allied attack from the air on the death camps was
illusory and so ludicrous that air commanders never considered it a viable option.9 Stuart
G. Erdheim disagreed with Kitchens’ conclusion in an article entitled “Could the Allies
Have Bombed Auschwitz-Birkenau.” Erdheim argued that Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
Norman Bottomly and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
General Carl Spaatz both knew about the camps and they were sympathetic to finding a
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reasonable answer to the problem.10 Air Marshal Bottomly wrote a memo to the
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff in which he requested a significant amount of aerial
photographs taken immediately so they could be studied for possible action. This memo
alone indicated that the bombing of the camps was not out of the question at this point.
This memo was a strong counter point to Kitchens’ argument by maintaining that as of
June of 1944 Auschwitz-Birkenau was an achievable target. Yes, the camps were
achievable targets but military leaders never seriously considered them targets because
they did not want to train photo interpreters and pilots to destroy the crematoriums
Erdheim refuted Kitchens on his argument that the Vrba-Wetzler report had minimal
military purpose. Kitchens argued that the report gave little detail of the camp and did
not help in the planning of bombing raids. The point of Erdheim’s argument was that this
report was as good as most first-hand reports the Allies received during the war on any
targets they chose to explore. Photo intelligence was crucial to any bombing plan and
had the allied command looked seriously at the report and used the photoreconnaissance
available then Auschwitz-Birkenau was a feasible target. Kitchens quoted Richard
Foregger, who was a medical doctor and an amateur historian as his main source on the
aerial reconnaissance issue.11 Richard Levy in his article “The Bombing of Auschwitz
Revisited: A Critical Analysis” argued that aerial reconnaissance was a necessity but the
military would have needed to have the aid of escapees to pinpoint targets. Levy
completely ignored the Vrba-Wetzler report and he based his entire argument on
Foregger’s research. That alone undermined the credibility of his argument. Neither
Kitchens nor Levy referred to the study by Dino Brugioni. Brugioni is an expert in
photoreconnaissance and maintained that had photo interpreters been trained about what
to look for, the gas chambers and crematoriums would have been easily found. This was
the point that Kitchens, Levy and Foregger missed. The Allied commanders gave no
priority to the rescue of Jewish prisoners at these two camps.
Other mistakes made by Kitchens were that he described the layout of the camps as a
lot wider in scope than they actually were and he referenced them as “dauntingly
complex.” Erdheim disagreed with this assessment, and he pointed to several reasons
10
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why the task was not as daunting as Kitchens made it appear. In the second half of 1943
Crematorium I at Auschwitz I was no longer operational and by the spring of 1944 when
most of the photographs were taken, it was being used as bomb shelter. Auschwitz had
no buildings with tall chimneys like the one at Birkenau; therefore, there was no
confusion on which were the gas chambers and which were the crematoriums. The
crematoriums at Birkenau were not widely dispersed as Kitchens contended, but in reality
they were lined in a periphery in the westernmost part of the camp. The crematoriums
stood alone in the camps and they for the most part were the tallest buildings in the
camps and would have been relatively easy to detect if the interpreters had known to look
for them. Levy argued that even if the killing units were attacked, it would not have
made a significant difference in the killing process. Levy also argued that the other
killing facilities like Crematorium I, which was not functional in 1944, and other gas
chambers would have had to be bombed.12 Erdheim presented evidence that refuted this
conclusion when he stated that the crematoriums at Birkenau, not Auschwitz, incinerated
the vast majority of the Jews in the camps. If the U.S. military had used Levy’s logic and
rejected other targets based on the premise that not all possible targets could not be
destroyed, how many other missions would have been aborted throughout the war? The
point of emphasis was that a different set of rules and rationales were used for Jewish
rescue targets than were used for other military targets.
There has been a considerable amount of debate over how much the Allies actually
knew about the death camps. Some historians argued that the Allies did not know
enough about the camps to develop a bombing campaign and others had concluded that
there was sufficient evidence to prove the information was available. It was widely
known within the War and State Departments that Auschwitz existed and these two
departments had located a total of six death camps. By 1944, the War Department had
identified the leading Nazi SS men by name and rank and the State Department had
classified Birkenau as a “Special KL” annihilation camp for women that consisted mostly
of Hungarian Jews.13 High-ranking members of the State Department concluded that the
reports of the concentration camps were pushed to the side and conveniently misplaced
12
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because Washington and London did not want any diversions to their total emphasis on
defeating the Nazis. It was reasonable to accept this because it was consistent with
Allied attitudes toward European Jews throughout the war. There has not been any
definitive argument presented that the Allies did not know what went on at AuschwitzBirkenau. The evidence clearly indicated that information about the concentration camps
was in existence since 1939. In 1944, F.D.R. stated that, “The systematic murder of
Hungarian Jews was one of the blackest hours in all of history and those that stand idly
by are as guilty as the executioners.”14 With this statement Roosevelt admitted
knowledge of the existence of the camps, but he did not commit the resources that were
available to help rescue the Hungarian Jews in the camps. His statement was made two
months before the Nazis began the mass deportations of the Hungarian Jews into the
camps.
German defenses at Auschwitz have often been used as a reason that attacks would
have been ineffective on the camp. It was true that 79 heavy flak guns were added to
Auschwitz-Birkenau camps in August of 1944. These guns were not at the camps from
March through July of 1944. From March through July of 1944 there were only twenty
flak guns at the camps that could have reached the altitude that the Allied bombers flew.
This was the perfect time for the bombing to begin. The Allies had the airbase in Foggia,
Italy that could reach the camps and as we now know F.D.R. knew about the camps by
March of 1944. Most of the arguments against bombing were because of the increased
anti-aircraft flak guns at the camps and in the surrounding area after August 20th. March
through July was the time that bombing raids could have been successful on the camps.
Critics have argued that small arms fire, the Luftwaffe, and weather factors could have
disrupted bombing plans. Small arms fire was almost no threat to the bombers because
SS guards at the camps were reported to run for cover when air raids occurred. They
were trained to guard prisoners who were half-starved instead of defending against Allied
heavy bombers. By 1944 the Luftwaffe represented no threat to Allied planes and they
did not mount any serious opposition to any Allied attacks on oil plants in the Upper
Silesia. The argument that the Luftwaffe could establish and sustain a formidable
defense was merit less by the middle of 1944. The belief that bad weather could hamper
14
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the bombing raids and make them utterly useless was also debatable. General James
Doolittle was influential in the placement of the 15th Air Force in Italy because the
weather conditions were better than in London. The 15th Air Force experienced a lower
percentage of aborted missions due to bad weather than the 8th Air Force in London from
April to September of 1944. To give the argument of bad weather less credibility, the
Allied bombers reported clear visibility throughout the summer of 1944 in Upper Silesia.
This was the area where Auschwitz-Birkenau was located.
High altitude bombing came under immense scrutiny by critics because they felt that
bombers in World War II were not accurate and many camp prisoners would have died in
the bombing raids. This contention loses its credibility when the Buchenwald bombing
raid is reviewed. The Buchenwald air raid was a perfect example that allied bombers
could incapacitate a camp without killing many prisoners. Three hundred eighty-four
prisoners were killed at Buchenwald but that was because they were working in the
factories at Gustloff Works and were not allowed to take shelter in the adjacent camp
during an air raid.15 This was another example that these camps could be bombed with
precision and with minimal prisoner casualties. Most of the prisoners at AuschwitzBirkenau worked outside the camp and would be nowhere near the gas chambers and
crematoriums. Bombing accuracy increased dramatically with good weather and weather
conditions during the summer of 1944 were perfect for high altitude bombing. In this
type of bombing raid, P-38 bombers were considered a valuable resource because they
could carry 1000 pound bombs and a sufficient amount of fuel that was needed to
complete the round trip flight to the camps.
Critics argued that the Ploesti raid was the perfect example of why the P-38 bombers
would not be useful against Auschwitz. What critics did not realize was that Ploesti was
the third most heavily fortified city under German control in 1943 plus there was heavy
smoke and bad weather that caused visibility problems. Auschwitz was not as heavily
defended as Ploesti in 1944 and the weather was not a factor. Critics of the bombing of
Auschwitz-Birkeanu used scenarios that were not applicable to these camps. Thus, the
situation in 1944 was perfect for an attack on the death camps in Poland.
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The arguments against the bombing of Auschwitz-Birkenau do not carry as much
weight as the arguments for bombing. Scholars such as James H. Kitchens III and
Richard H. Levy concluded that if the Allies had bombed the camps that many prisoners
would have been killed. This argument was not correct because most of the prisoners at
the camps, especially Birkenau, worked outside the camp as was mentioned earlier. The
discussion of weather conditions at the time the bombing raids should have occurred
were ideal for high altitude bombing. The crematoriums were clearly visible and a
significant amount of bombing accuracy was achievable. In addition, the bombing
opponents misjudged another point by mid 1944; the Nazis did not have the capability to
rebuild the gas chambers and crematoriums as quickly as they had originally built them.
If the Allies had bombed and destroyed Crematoria II and III at Birkenau, then 75% of
the Nazi killing capability at the camp would have been eliminated.16 Even though the
destruction of these crematoriums would not have ended the mass killings, this would
have significantly altered the Nazi means of killing by making them less efficient. Many
historians will argue, what is the point of bombing the crematoriums if they were not in
use? If you are looking at the situation from today’s perspective then there is no reason.
We are studying the bombing from the information available in 1944. In 1944 the Allies
did not know the crematoriums were not functional.
No one can conclusively argue that the destruction of the Nazi extermination camps
would have saved thousands of Jews. However, the evidence that has surfaced since the
Holocaust proved that bombing was a viable option and one that would have helped slow
the mass murder. The argument that bombing was not accurate enough to hit the targets
at the camps and the diversion of invaluable military resources misses the point about the
Auschwitz-Birkenau debate. The United States government never made the rescue of
European Jews a priority during World War II and this was the major reason why the
camps were not bombed. Aerial reconnaissance photos taken during 1944 clearly
showed the gas chambers and crematoriums. This nullified the argument by Allied
commanders that the targets were indistinguishable and difficult to find. In fact,
Auschwitz was bombed once by accident. Numerous bombing raids flew over Aushwitz-
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Birkenau in 1944, but it was militarily unfeasible to drop any of those bombs on the
camps killing machines? The true lack of understanding about the Jewish issue by the
Allies resulted in massive loss of life. Doris Kearns Goodwin, a noted Roosevelt
historian, surmised that F.D.R. misunderstood the importance of this issue, which caused
opportunities of monumental proportions to be missed.17 What has eluded some scholars
on the Holocaust is that Roosevelt and Churchill had only to order the bombing of these
camps to make them a priority of Allied field commanders. The implementation of
Jewish rescue plans had to come from the top in order for priority to be given to it. F.D.R
had the ultimate power over rescue operations. He chose not to order the bombing raids
as a means to rescue the Jews.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The American response to the Holocaust and European refugees is difficult to describe
and put into historical perspective. There are many aspects to this issue that make
coming to a single conclusion as to what the United States should have done a difficult
task. There were many factors that contributed to the actions taken by the American
government on the issue of refugees, i.e. European Jews, which influenced the American
public’s opinions at the time. Three key factors that influenced American policy toward
European Jews were anti-Semitism, nativism, and restrictionism. During the first four
decades of the twentieth century anti-Semitism was prevalent throughout American
society; Jews were barred from many professions, and it was not uncommon for vacation
resorts to advertise themselves as preferring a “Christian clientele.”1 The National
Origins Act of 1924 that was enacted by Congress severely limited the immigration of
Eastern Europeans to the United States. Many of the Europeans were Jewish. The act
would later be the cornerstone of American policies in the 1930s and 1940s. Another
factor that hindered a constructive response was a failure of imagination, intelligence,
misjudgment of the murderous nature of Nazism, and a false optimism that the ‘Final
Solution’ was not as horrendous as it turned out to be.2
The rise of anti-Semitic figures grew throughout the 1930s. Father Charles Coughlin
and his social justice movement preached virulent anti-Semitism throughout the decade.
Coughlin following and radio program had an impact on the American public and helped
shape their opinions on European refugees. Along with Coughlin, William Dudley Pelley
and his ‘silver shirts’ was a hate group that rose to prominence during the 1930s. Not
only did Pelley use his vast newspaper resources to spread hatred, but he also helped
awaken the American public’s misperception that immigrants would destroy the United
States. Another hate group that had a loyal following in the U.S. was the German1
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American Bund, which helped evoke hidden fears that the American people had about
European Jews. Also, this group helped unleash an anti-Semitism that was part of
American society. These were individuals and groups who used the economic peril that
the U.S. was in to unleash fear and misunderstandings of different cultures.
The Great Depression also had impact on American public opinion to the Holocaust.
To understand why the American public and the U.S. Government wanted and enforced
such strict immigration policies must begin with the depression. Anti-Semitism,
nativism, and restrictionism flourished with the scarcity of unemployment in the U.S.
during the 1930s. A common slogan was “American jobs for Americans.” Immigrants
were seen as competitors for jobs and were viewed with animosity. The public was led to
believe that refugees would cause the American economy to collapse. In retrospect,
allowing European immigrants into the U.S. would not have affected the economy
significantly one way or the other. The reality of the time was that finding sufficient
amounts of food was more important than worrying if the Nazis were mistreating German
Jews. The Great Depression was the major obstacle that prevented immigration laws
from being loosened by Congress and Roosevelt. The restrictionists exploited the fears
of the American public and convinced them that immigrants offered no benefits for this
country.
F.D.R. was the single-most important figure in the United States in regards to
immigration of refugees. Roosevelt had two policies when it pertained to refugees. The
first was compliance with restrictionist legislation in the 1920s and second was the
symbolic humanitarianism extended toward a suffering minority.3 These two policies
summed up Roosevelt’s attitude toward European Jews. He was handcuffed by the
policies enacted by the restrictionist congress. His ‘New Deal’ economic policy only
partially succeeded because politically he was inclined to lean towards the restrictionists.
However, this does not absolve him from blame on this issue. He knew from reliable
sources that the Nazis were mistreating Jews, and if he had any doubt, Kristallnacht in
1938 should have dispelled misconception. The Evian Conference did not produce any
type of solution to the problem because the unemployment rate in the U.S. was at an all
time high and the restrictionists were not going to allow any type of loosened
3
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immigration laws. In the 1930s, even if Roosevelt had wanted to help European Jews,
Congress was not going to allow it. Roosevelt’s indifference toward European Jews
began to show in the 1940s. He was convinced by the State Department that a German
‘fifth column’ had developed within the United States. After the U.S. entered World War
II he had no interest in European Jews until it was too late. The war was Roosevelt’s
focus, and he was convinced that the only way to save European Jews was to defeat the
Nazis. All the resources that were available to him were given to the war effort.
Roosevelt did organize the Bermuda Conference in 1943, in reality the conference was
organized to appease the American Jewish leadership and divert political pressure away
from him.
Long was the State Department’s chief architect on immigration during the 1940s and
he probably did more to cease immigration than anyone. Long, a restrictionist in the
strongest sense, was convinced that the German “fifth-column” was a reality. He told
Roosevelt that the fifth-column was a serious threat, and this allowed him to tighten
restrictions to make immigration it almost non-existent. The State Department’s visa
division made the immigration application extremely difficult and the processing of the
application very time consuming. David Wyman referred to the process as the ‘paper
wall’ that the U.S. Government developed to stop refugee immigration. Many historians
and scholars have argued that Long was anti-Semitic along with being a restrictionist.
Long was too well educated to verbalize directly or put into print any anti-Semitic views.
He often used the term “the New York Boys” to refer to Jewish political leaders, without
ever directly linking himself with anti-Semitism. Long and other State Department
officials, such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull, demonstrated a lack of interest in saving
European Jews. Long did everything in his power to make sure the Bermuda Conference
made a mockery of rescue attempts. This again is where F.D.R. deserves some blame.
He appointed Long, knowing that he was a restrictionist and borderline anti-Semitic.
Roosevelt never questioned any of Long’s decisions in regards to immigration and thus
gave him total control with respect to American policies on immigration. Long had
strong support for his ideas throughout the State Department and without the efforts of
Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Long would have prevented the development
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of the War Refugee Board. Long and Roosevelt should be linked together on the issue of
immigration. Long applied the restrictions and Roosevelt allowed him to do so.
Although the Great Depression, the rise of anti-Semitic groups, Roosevelt, Long, and
World War II had an immense impact on immigration policy and American public
opinion, two other groups deserve considerable blame, American Jewry and the Vatican.
American Jewry failed miserably in two critical facets of rescue. They never developed
one unified organization to protest and they had blind faith in Roosevelt. American
Jewry was divided between Zionists and non-Zionists. These two factions could never
formulate a united group for protest. American Jewry’s most important spokesman
during this critical time was Rabbi Stephen Wise. Rabbi Wise was growing older and
this dilemma was too much for one person to bear. Rabbi received excessive criticism
from other Jewish leaders on his handling of the refugee situation. His complete trust
that Roosevelt would do everything in his power to save the Jews was his second major
mistake that hindered rescue efforts. Even though he was criticized for his efforts in the
refugee dilemma, no other Jewish leaders stepped to the forefront to take over for him.
Rabbi Wise, being just one person, received too much blame from the Jewish community.
American Jewry as a collective whole did a terrible job in convincing the American
public how serious the Jewish problem was. American Jewry did not want to separate the
Jewish community from the rest of the American public, the non-Zionist in particular,
and they basically wanted to blend in with the rest of American society. Even though
Jews held power positions within Congress and many places within F.D.R. State
Department, American Jewry was afraid that they would alienate themselves from the
rest of America and this would result in even less rescue efforts.
The Vatican, which was not addressed in detail throughout this study, deserves
significant blame as well for indifference towards European Jews. During the 1930s and
1940s the Vatican, under the direction of Pope Pius XII, was the most powerful and
organized church organization in the world. Consequently, a study of the Nazis treatment
of Jews would not be complete without some discussion of the Vatican’s silence.
Throughout the Holocaust the Vatican conveyed a persistent and depressing attitude of
disbelief.4 The Vatican did not believe, or ignored, the reports of mass murder. The
4
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Vatican had a long history of indifference when it related to Jews. Rarely, during the
1930s and 1940s did the Pope and the Vatican council denounce Nazi discrimination of
Jews. Was it a lack of interest in the Jewish plight or was the Vatican delicately playing
the Nazis? No one really knows the true answer to that question. The Vatican could
have been waiting for a more opportune time for rescue efforts. Even after the Vatican
learned of the mass killings it did not denounce them. Again, the Vatican may not have
felt it was in any position to help. They may have been satisfied to leave the subject
alone because of the fear of Nazi retribution. The Vatican leadership cannot use the
excuse that they did not know the entire details of Jewish mistreatment. For instance,
around the same time as Gerhard Riegner made his report known, March-April 1942, the
Vatican was fully aware of the situation of the Polish Jews. The Vatican knew as much
as anyone else about what was transpiring in Poland and did nothing. The Vatican
response has also been called one more of coward ness than anti-Semitic.5 It can be
argued that it was a mixture of both. The Vatican was well aware of what the Nazis
could do and had done to those who opposed them. Historically, the Vatican had a track
record of indifference when it pertained to Jews. The Vatican had resources that could
have helped rescue European Jews. They chose not to use them. All of the groups
mentioned share to some degree of blame for the extent of the Holocaust.
The final chapter concerned the debate over the bombing of Auschwitz-Birkenau
extermination camp. Some historians concluded that both could have and should have
been bombed, while other historians surmised that bombing would be extremely
dangerous, and by 1944 the raids would have been ineffective. Historians on both sides
of this debate have valid points. The pro-bombing historians show that the raids were
possible because the U.S. had an airbase in Italy in 1944 and air force bombers had the
capability to reach Auschwitz-Birkenau. In fact, the U.S. bombed the I.G. Farben plant
that was only fifty miles from the extermination camps. Many pilots claimed that they
flew almost directly over the camp on their bombing missions. The U.S. military used
the excuse that the bombing of the camp was too dangerous because of the Nazi
fortifications surrounding the camps. Auschwitz-Birkeanu, however, was not as heavily

5

Randolph L. Braham, The Holocaust as Historical Experience: Essays and Discussion, eds. , Yehuda
Bauer and Nathan Rotestreich (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981) 11.

73

fortified as the military claimed. Most of the pilots who flew over the camp had no idea
at the time what the camp contained. They were trained to look for military targets.
The Allies had no intention of helping the Jews at Auschwitz. By 1944 the vast
majority of Jews had been killed by the Nazis, but this in no way excuses the Allies from
attempting rescue. Based on the information that was available to the Allies, they did
not know that bombing was futile in saving any significant amount of Jewish prisoners.
In retrospect, we know that the crematoriums were not in use by mid-1944, but we did no
this in 1944. As far as the Allies knew the prisoners were still being gassed in large
numbers. Morally the Allies should have tried bombings even if they turned out
unsuccessful.
Any study on European refugees in the 1930s and 1940s is difficult especially when
dealing with American public opinion and government actions. The American response
to the situation conveys several different ideas of the time. The first was the U.S.
Government’s and the American public’s disbelief that the Nazis were capable of mass
murder of European Jews; second, was the widespread indifference throughout the U.S.
when it pertained to European refugees; and third, the unwillingness of the United States
to break established patterns of nativism, restrictionism, and anti-Semitism that were
prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s. These three factors influenced all parts of American
life at the worst possible time for European refugees. Because the Great Depression and
World War II were very influential in the way Americans viewed refugees, these two
events caused the restrictionist attitude, that later became anti-Semitic, to gain acceptance
with the American public. The events also influenced Congress, Roosevelt, the State
Department, and American Jewish leaders. When all factors were placed together, the
U.S. became indifferent toward European refugees and this allowed the Nazis to
implement the ‘Final Solution’ that almost erased Jews from Europe.
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